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Abstract
Observed inﬂation targets around the industrial world are concentrated at two per-
cent per year. This chapter investigates the extent to which the observed magnitudes
of inﬂation targets are consistent with the optimal rate of inﬂation predicted by lead-
ing theories of monetary nonneutrality. We ﬁnd that consistently those theories imply
that the optimal rate of inﬂation ranges from minus the real rate of interest to num-
bers insigniﬁcantly above zero. Furthermore, we argue that the zero bound on nominal
interest rates does not represent an impediment for setting inﬂation targets near or
below zero. Finally, we ﬁnd that central banks should adjust their inﬂation targets
upward by the size of the quality bias in measured inﬂation only if hedonic prices are
more sticky than are non-quality-adjusted prices.
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The inﬂation objectives of virtually all central banks around the world are signiﬁcantly
above zero. Among monetary authorities in industrial countries that self-classify as inﬂation
targeters, for example, inﬂation targets are concentrated at a level of two percent per year
(table 1). Inﬂation objectives are about one percentage point higher in inﬂation-targeting
emerging countries. The central goal of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which
the observed magnitudes of inﬂation targets are consistent with the optimal rate of inﬂation
predicted by leading theories of monetary nonneutrality. We ﬁnd that consistently those
theories imply that the optimal rate of inﬂation ranges from minus the real rate of interest
to numbers insigniﬁcantly above zero. Our ﬁndings suggest that the empirical regularity
regarding the size of inﬂation targets cannot be reconciled with the optimal long-run inﬂation
rates predicted by existing theories. In this sense, the observed inﬂation objectives of central
banks pose a puzzle for monetary theory.
In the existing literature, two major sources of monetary nonneutrality govern the deter-
mination of the optimal long-run rate of inﬂation. One source is a nominal friction stemming
from a demand for ﬁat money. The second source is given by the assumption of price stick-
iness.
In monetary models in which the only nominal friction takes the form of a demand
for ﬁat money for transaction purposes, optimal monetary policy calls for minimizing the
opportunity cost of holding money by setting the nominal interest rate to zero. This policy,
also known as the Friedman rule, implies an optimal rate of inﬂation that is negative and
equal in absolute value to the real rate of interest. If the long-run real rate of interest lies,
say, between two and four percent, the optimal rate of inﬂation predicted by this class of
models would lie between minus two and minus four percent. This prediction is clearly at
odds with observed inﬂation targets. A second important result that emerges in this class of
models is that the Friedman rule is optimal regardless of whether the government is assumed
to ﬁnance its budget via lump-sum taxes or via distortionary income taxes. This result has
been given considerable attention in the literature because it runs against the conventional
wisdom that in a second-best world all goods, including money holdings, should be subject
to taxation.
One way to induce optimal policy to deviate from the Friedman rule in this type of model
is to assume that the tax system is incomplete. We study three sources of tax incomplete-
ness that give rise to optimal inﬂation rates above the one consistent with the Friedman
rule: untaxed proﬁts due to decreasing returns to scale with perfect competition in product
markets, untaxed proﬁts due to monopolistic competition in product markets, and untaxed
1Table 1: Inﬂation Targets Around the World
Inﬂation Target
Country (percent)
Industrial Countries
New Zealand 1-3
Canada 1-3
United Kingdom 2
Australia 2-3
Sweden 2 ±1
Switzerland < 2
Iceland 2.5
Norway 2.5
Emerging Countries
Israel 1-3
Czech Republic 3 ±1
Korea 2.5-3.5
Poland 2.5 ±1
Brazil 4.5 ± 2.5
Chile 2-4
Colombia 5 ± 1.5
South Africa 3-6
Thailand 0-3.5
Mexico 3± 1
Hungary 3.5 ± 1
Peru 2.5 ±1
Philippines 5-6
Source: World Economic Outlook 2005.
income due to tax evasion. These three cases have in common that the monetary authority
ﬁnds it optimal to use inﬂation as an indirect levy on pure rents that would otherwise re-
main untaxed. We evaluate these three avenues for rationalizing optimal deviations from the
Friedman rule both analytically and quantitatively. We ﬁnd that in all three cases the share
of untaxed income required to justify an optimal inﬂation rate of about two percent, which
would be in line with observed inﬂation targets, is unreasonably large (above 30 percent).
We conclude that tax incompleteness is an unlikely candidate for explaining the magnitude
of actual inﬂation targets.
Countries whose currency is used abroad may have incentives to deviate from the Fried-
man rule as a way to collect resources from foreign residents. This rationale for a positive
inﬂation target is potentially important for the United States, the bulk of whose currency
circulates abroad. Motivated by these observations, we characterize the optimal rate of inﬂa-
2tion in an economy with a foreign demand for its currency in the context of a model in which
in the absence of such foreign demand the Friedman rule would be optimal. We show analyt-
ically that once a foreign demand for domestic currency is taken into account, the Friedman
rule ceases to be Ramsey optimal. Calibrated versions of the model that match the range of
empirical estimates of the size of foreign demand for U.S. currency deliver Ramsey optimal
rates of inﬂation between 2 and 10 percent per annum. The fact that developed countries
whose currency is hardly demanded abroad, such as Canada, New Zealand, and Australia,
set inﬂation targets similar to those that have been estimated for the United States, sug-
gests that although the United States does have incentives to tax foreign dollar holdings via
inﬂation, it must not be acting on such incentives. The question of why the United States
appears to leave this margin unexploited deserves further study.
Overall, our examination of models in which a transactional demand for money is the
sole source of nominal friction leads us to conclude that this class of models fails to provide
a compelling explanation for the magnitude of observed inﬂation targets.
The second major source of monetary nonneutrality studied in the literature is given
by nominal rigidities in the form of sluggish price adjustment. Models that incorporate
this type of friction as the sole source of monetary nonneutrality predict that the optimal
rate of inﬂation is zero. This prediction of the sticky-price model is robust to assuming
that nominal prices are partially indexed to past inﬂation. The reason for the optimality
of price stability is that it eliminates the ineﬃciencies brought about by the presence of
price-adjustment costs. Clearly, the sticky-price friction brings the optimal rate of inﬂation
much closer to observed inﬂation targets than does the money-demand friction. However,
the predictions of the sticky-price model for the optimal rate of inﬂation still fall short of the
two percent inﬂation target prevailing in developed economies and the three percent inﬂation
target prevailing in developing countries.
One might be led to believe that the problem of explaining observed inﬂation targets is
more diﬃcult than the predictions of the sticky-price model suggest. For a realistic model
of the monetary transmission mechanism must incorporate both major sources of monetary
nonneutrality, price stickiness and a transactional demand for ﬁat money. Indeed, in such a
model the optimal rate of inﬂation falls in between the one called for by the money demand
friction—deﬂation at the real rate of interest—and the one called for by the sticky price
friction—zero inﬂation. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The benevolent
government faces a tradeoﬀ between minimizing price adjustment costs and minimizing the
opportunity cost of holding money. Quantitative analysis of this tradeoﬀ, however, suggests
that under plausible model parameterizations, this tradeoﬀ is resolved in favor of price
stability.
3The theoretical arguments considered thus far leave the predicted optimal inﬂation target
at least two percentage points below its empirical counterpart. We therefore consider three
additional arguments that have been proposed as possible explanations of this gap: the zero
bound on nominal interest rates, downward nominal rigidities in factor prices, and a quality
bias in the measurement of inﬂation.
It is often argued in policy circles that at zero or negative rates of inﬂation the risk of
hitting the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates would severely restrict the central
bank’s ability to conduct successful stabilization policy. The validity of this argument de-
pends critically on the predicted volatility of the nominal interest rate under the optimal
monetary policy regime. To investigate the plausibility of this explanation of positive in-
ﬂation targets, we characterize optimal monetary policy in the context of a medium-scale
macroeconomic model estimated to ﬁt business-cycles in the postwar United States. We ﬁnd
that under the optimal monetary policy the inﬂation rate has a mean of -0.4 percent. More
importantly, the optimal nominal interest rate has a mean of 4.4 percent and a standard
deviation of 0.9 percent. This ﬁnding implies that hitting the zero bound would require
a decline in the equilibrium nominal interest rate of more than four standard deviations.
We regard such event as highly unlikely. This statement ought not to be misinterpreted as
meaning that given an inﬂation target of -0.4 percent the economy would face a negligible
chance of hitting the zero bound under any monetary policy. The correct interpretation is
more narrow, namely that such event would be improbable under the optimal policy regime.
The second additional rational for targeting positive inﬂation that we address is the
presence of downward nominal rigidities. When nominal prices are downwardly rigid, then
any relative price change must be associated with an increase in the nominal price level.
It follows that to the extent that over the business cycle variations in relative prices are
eﬃcient, a positive rate of inﬂation, aimed at accommodating such changes may be welfare
improving. Perhaps the most prominent example of a downwardly rigid price is the nominal
wage. A natural question, therefore, is how much inﬂation is necessary to ‘grease the wheel
of the labor market.’ The answer appears to be not much. An incipient literature using
estimated macroeconomic models with downwardly rigid nominal wages ﬁnds optimal rates
of inﬂation below 50 basis points.
The ﬁnal argument for setting inﬂation targets signiﬁcantly above zero that we consider
is the well known fact that due to unmeasured quality improvements in consumption goods
the consumer price index overstates the true rate of inﬂation. For example, in the United
States a Senate appointed commission of prominent academic economists established that
in the year 1995-1996 the quality bias in CPI inﬂation was about 0.6 percent per year. We
therefore analyze whether the central bank should adjust its inﬂation target to account for
4the systematic upward bias in measured inﬂation. We show that the answer to this question
depends crucially on what prices are assumed to be sticky. Speciﬁcally, if nonquality-adjusted
prices are sticky, then the inﬂation target should not be corrected. If, on the other hand,
quality-adjusted (or hedonic) prices are sticky, then the inﬂation target should be raised
by the magnitude of the bias. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether non-quality
adjusted or hedonic prices are more sticky. This question is yet to be addressed by the
empirical literature on price rigidities.
Throughout this chapter, we refer to the optimal rate of inﬂation as the one that maxi-
mizes the welfare of the representative consumer. We limit attention to Ramsey optimality.
That is, the government is assumed to be able to commit to its policy announcements. Fi-
nally, in all of the models considered, households and ﬁrms are assumed to be optimizing
agents with rational expectations.
2 Money Demand and the Optimal Rate of Inﬂation
When the central nominal friction in the economy originates in the need of economic agents to
use money to perform transactions, under quite general conditions, optimal monetary policy
calls for a zero opportunity cost of holding money, a result known as the Friedman rule. In
ﬁat money economies in which assets used for transactions purposes do not earn interest,
the opportunity cost of holding money equals the nominal interest rate. Therefore, in the
class of models in which the demand for money is the central nominal friction, the optimal
monetary policy prescribes that the risk-less nominal interest rate—the return on Federal
funds, say—be set at zero at all times. Because in the long run inﬂationary expectations
are linked to the diﬀerential between nominal and real rates of interest, the Friedman rule
ultimately leads to deﬂation at the real rate of interest.
A money demand friction can be motivated in a variety of ways, including a cash-in-
advance constraint (Lucas, 1982), money in the utility function (Sidrauski, 1967), a shopping-
time technology (Kimbrough, 1986), or a transactions-cost technology (Feenstra, 1986). Re-
gardless of how a demand for money is introduced, the intuition for why the Friedman rule
is optimal when the single nominal friction stems from the demand for money is straight-
forward: real money balances provide valuable transaction services to households and ﬁrms.
At the same time, the cost of printing money is negligible. Therefore, it is eﬃcient to set the
opportunity cost of holding money, given by the nominal interest rate, as low as possible. A
further reason why the Friedman rule is optimal is that a positive interest rate can distort the
eﬃcient allocation of resources. For instance, in the cash-in-advance model with cash and
credit goods, a positive interest rate distorts the allocation of private spending across these
5two types of goods. In models in which money ameliorates transaction costs or decreases
shopping time, a positive interest rate introduces a wedge in the consumption-leisure choice.
To illustrate the optimality of the Friedman rule, consider augmenting a neoclassical
model with a transaction cost that is decreasing in real money holdings and increasing in
consumption spending. Speciﬁcally, consider an economy populated by a large number of
identical households. Each household has preferences deﬁned over sequences of consumption
and leisure and described by the utility function
∞ X
t=0
β
tU(ct,h t), (1)
where ct denotes consumption, ht denotes labor eﬀort, and β ∈ (0,1) denotes the subjec-
tive discount factor. The single period utility function U is assumed to be increasing in
consumption, decreasing in eﬀort, and strictly concave.
A demand for real balances is introduced into the model by assuming that nominal money
holdings, denoted Mt, facilitate consumption purchases. Speciﬁcally, consumption purchases
are subject to a proportional transaction cost s(vt) that is decreasing in the household’s
money-to-consumption ratio, or consumption-based money velocity,
vt =
Ptct
Mt
, (2)
where Pt denotes the nominal price of the consumption good in period t. The transaction
cost function, s(v), satisﬁes the following assumptions: (a) s(v) is nonnegative and twice
continuously diﬀerentiable; (b) There exists a level of velocity v > 0, to which we refer as
the satiation level of money, such that s(v)=s0(v) = 0; (c) (v − v)s0(v) > 0 for v 6= v;
and (d) 2s0(v)+vs00(v) > 0 for all v ≥ v. Assumption (b) ensures that the Friedman rule,
i.e., a zero nominal interest rate, need not be associated with an inﬁnite demand for money.
It also implies that both the transaction cost and the distortion it introduces vanish when
the nominal interest rate is zero. Assumption (c) guarantees that in equilibrium money
velocity is always greater than or equal to the satiation level. Assumption (d) ensures that
the demand for money is a decreasing function of the nominal interest rate.
Households are assumed have access to one-period nominal bonds, denoted Bt, which
carry a gross nominal interest rate of Rt when held from period t to period t+1. Households
supply labor services to competitive labor markets at the real wage rate wt. In addition,
households receive proﬁt income in the amount Πt from the ownership of ﬁrms. The ﬂow
6budget constraint of the household in period t is then given by:
Ptct[1 + s(vt)] + Ptτt + Mt + Bt = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Pt(wtht +Π t), (3)
where τt denotes real taxes paid in period t. In addition, it is assumed that the household
is subject to the following borrowing limit that prevents it from engaging in Ponzi-type
schemes:
lim
j→∞
Mt+j + Rt+jBt+j
Qj
s=0 Rt+s
≥ 0. (4)
This restriction states that in the long run the household’s net nominal liabilities must grow
at a rate smaller than the nominal interest rate. It rules out, for example, schemes in which
households roll over their net debts forever.
The household chooses sequences {ct,h t,v t,M t,B t}∞
t=0 to maximize (1) subject to (2)-(4),
taking as given the sequences {Pt,τ t,R t,w t,Πt}∞
t=0 and the initial condition M−1 +R−1B−1.
The ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the household’s maximization problem are (2),
(3), (4) holding with equality, and
v
2
ts
0(vt)=
Rt − 1
Rt
(5)
−
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
=
wt
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
(6)
Uc(ct,h t)
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
= β
Rt
πt+1
Uc(ct+1,h t+1)
[1 + s(vt+1)+vt+1s0(vt+1)]
, (7)
where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denotes the gross rate of price inﬂation in period t. Optimality condi-
tion (5) can be interpreted as a demand for money or liquidity preference function. Given our
maintained assumptions about the transactions technology s(vt), the implied money demand
function is decreasing in the gross nominal interest rate Rt. Further, our assumptions imply
that as the interest rate vanishes, or Rt approaches unity, the demand for money reaches a
ﬁnite maximum level given by ct/v. At this level of money demand, households are able to
perform transactions costlessly, as the transactions cost, s(vt), becomes nil. Optimality con-
dition (6) shows that a level of money velocity above the satiation level v, or, equivalently,
an interest rate greater than zero, introduces a wedge, given by 1+s(vt)+vts0(vt), between
the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure and the real wage rate. This
wedge induces households to move to an ineﬃcient allocation featuring too much leisure and
too little consumption. The wedge is increasing in the nominal interest rate, implying that
the larger is the nominal interest rate, the more distorted is the consumption-leisure choice.
Optimality condition (7) is a Fisher equation stating that the nominal interest rate must be
7equal to the sum of the expected rate of inﬂation and the real rate of interest. It is clear
from the Fisher equation that intertemporal movements in the nominal interest rate create
a distortion in the real interest rate perceived by households.
Final goods are produced by competitive ﬁrms using the technology F(ht) that takes
labor as the only factor input. The production function F is assumed to be increasing and
concave. Firms choose labor input to maximize proﬁts, which are given by
Πt = F(ht) − wtht.
The ﬁrst-order condition associated with the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem gives rise
to the following demand for labor
F
0(ht)=wt. (8)
The government prints money, issues nominal, one-period bonds, and levies taxes to
ﬁnance an exogenous stream of public consumption, denoted gt and interest obligations on
the outstanding public debt. Accordingly, the government’s sequential budget constraint is
given by
Bt + Mt + Ptτt = Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Ptgt.
In this section, the government is assumed to follow a ﬁscal policy whereby taxes are lump
sum and government spending and public debt are nil at all times. In addition, the initial
amount of public debt outstanding, B−1, is assumed to be zero. These assumptions imply
that the government budget constraint simpliﬁes to
Ptτ
L
t + Mt − Mt−1 =0 ,
where τL
t denotes real lump-sum taxes. According to this expression, the government rebates
all seignorage income to households in a lump-sum fashion.
A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences {ct, ht, vt} satisfying (5) and
−
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
=
F 0(ht)
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
(9)
[1 + s(vt)]ct = F(ht), (10)
Rt ≥ 1, (11)
lim
j→∞
β
j Uc(ct+j,h t+j)
1+s(vt+j)+vt+js0(vt+j)
ct+j
vt+j
=0 , (12)
given some monetary policy. Equilibrium condition (9) states that the monetary friction
8places a wedge between the supply of labor and the demand for labor. Equilibrium condi-
tion (10) states that a positive interest rate entails a resource loss in the amount of s(vt)ct.
This resource loss is increasing in the interest rate and vanishes only when the nominal inter-
est rate equals zero. Equilibrium condition (11) imposes a zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate. Such a bound is required to prevent the possibility of unbounded arbitrage
proﬁts created by taking short positions in nominal bonds and long positions in nominal
ﬁat money, which would result in ill-deﬁned demands for consumption goods by households.
Equilibrium condition (12) results from combining the no-Ponzi-game constraint (4) holding
with equality with equations (2) and (7).
2.1 Optimality of the Friedman Rule with Lump-Sum Taxation
We wish to characterize optimal monetary policy under the assumption that the government
has the ability to commit to policy announcements. This policy optimality concept is known
as Ramsey optimality. In the context of the present model, the Ramsey optimal monetary
policy problem consists in choosing the path of the nominal interest rate that is associated
with the competitive equilibrium that yields the highest level of welfare to households. For-
mally, the Ramsey problem consists in choosing sequences Rt, ct, ht, and vt, to maximize
the household’s utility function given in equation (1) subject to equations (5) and (9)-(12).
As a preliminary step, before addressing the optimality of the Friedman rule, let us
consider whether the Friedman rule, that is,
Rt =1 , ∀t
can be supported as a competitive equilibrium outcome. This task involves ﬁnding sequences
ct, ht, and vt that, together with Rt = 1, satisfy the equilibrium conditions (5) and (9)-(12).
Clearly, equation (11) is satisﬁed by the sequence Rt = 1. Equation (5) and the assumptions
made about the transactions cost function s(v) imply that when Rt equals unity, money
velocity is at the satiation level,
vt = v.
This result implies that when the Friedman rule holds the transactions cost s(vt) vanishes.
Then equations (9) and (10) simplify to the two static equations:1
−
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
= F
0(ht)
1Suﬃcient, but not necessary, conditions for a unique, positive solution of these two equations are that
−Uh(c,h)/Uc(c,h) be positive and increasing in c and h and that F(h) be positive, strictly increasing and
that it satisfy the Inada conditions.
9and
ct = F(ht),
which jointly determine constant equilibrium levels of consumption and hours. Finally,
because the levels of velocity, consumption and hours are constant over time, and because
the subjective discount factor is less than unity, the transversality condition (12) is also
satisﬁed. We have therefore established that there exists a competitive equilibrium in which
the Friedman rule holds at all times.
Next, we show that this competitive equilibrium is indeed Ramsey optimal. To see this,
consider the solution to the social planner’s problem
max
{ct,ht,vt}
∞ X
t=0
β
tU(ct,h t)
subject to the feasibility constraint (10), which we repeat here for convenience:
[1 + s(vt)]ct = F(ht).
The reason why this social planner’s problem is of interest for establishing the optimality of
the Friedman rule is that its solution must deliver a level of welfare that is at least as high as
the level of welfare associated with the Ramsey optimal allocation. This is because both the
social planner’s problem and the Ramsey problem share the objective function (1) and the
feasibility constraint (10), but the Ramsey problem is subject to four additional constraints,
namely (5), (9), (11), and (12). Consider ﬁrst the social planner’s choice of money velocity,
vt. Money velocity enters only in the feasibility constraint but not in the planner’s objective
function. Because the transaction cost function s(v) has a global minimum at v, the social
planner will set vt = v. At the satiation level of velocity v the transaction cost vanishes, so
it follows that the feasibility constraint simpliﬁes to ct = F(ht). The optimal choice of the
pair (ct,h t) is then given by the solution to ct = F(ht) and −Uh(ct,h t)/Uc(ct,h t)=F 0(ht).
But this real allocation is precisely the one associated with the competitive equilibrium in
which the Friedman rule holds at all times. We have therefore established that the Friedman
rule is Ramsey optimal.
An important consequence of optimal monetary policy in the context of the present model
is that prices are expected to decline over time. In eﬀect, by equation (7) and taking into
account that in the Ramsey equilibrium consumption and leisure are constant over time,
expected inﬂation is given by πt+1 = β<1, for all t ≥ 0. Existing macroeconomic models of
the business cycle typically assign a value to the subjective discount factor of around 0.96
per annum. Under this calibration, the present model would imply that the average optimal
10rate of inﬂation is -4 percent per year.
It is important to highlight that the Friedman rule has ﬁscal consequences and requires
coordination between the monetary and ﬁscal authorities. In eﬀect, an implication of the
Friedman rule is that nominal money balances shrink at the same rate as prices. The policy
authority ﬁnances this continuous shrinkage of the money supply by levying lump-sum taxes
on households each period. In the present model, the amount of taxes necessary to cover
the seignorage losses created by the Friedman rule is given by τL
t =( 1 /β − 1)(Mt/Pt).2 For
instance, under a real interest rate of 4 percent (1/β−1) = 0.04), and a level of real balances
of 20 percent of GDP, the required level of taxes would be about 0.8 percent of GDP. The
ﬁscal authority would have to transfer this amount of resources to the central bank each year
in order for the latter to be able to absorb the amount of nominal money balances necessary
to keep the money supply at the desired level. Suppose the ﬁscal authority was unwilling
to subsidize the central bank in this fashion. Then the optimal-monetary-policy problem
would be like the one discussed thus far, but with the additional constraint that the growth
rate of the nominal money supply cannot be negative, Mt ≥ Mt−1. This restriction would
force the central bank to deviate from the Friedman rule, potentially in signiﬁcant ways. For
instance, if in the deterministic model discussed thus far, one restricts attention to equilibria
in which the nominal interest rate is constant and preferences are log-linear in consumption
and leisure, then the restricted Ramsey policy would call for price stability, Pt = Pt−1, and
a positive interest rate equal to the real rate of interest, Rt =1 /β.
The optimality of negative inﬂation at a rate close to the real rate of interest is robust
to adopting any of the alternative motives for holding money discussed at the beginning of
this section. It is also robust to the introduction of uncertainty in various forms, including
stochastic variations in total factor productivity, preference shocks, and government spending
shocks. However, the desirability of sizable average deﬂation is at odds with the inﬂation
objective of virtually every central bank. It follows that the money demand friction must
not be the main factor shaping policymakers’ views regarding the optimal level of inﬂation.
For this reason, we now turn to analyzing alternative theories of the cost and beneﬁts of
price inﬂation.
2In a growing economy the Friedman rule is associated with deﬂation as long as the real interest rate
is positive (just as in the nongrowing economy) and with seignorage losses as long as the real interest rate
exceeds the growth rate, which is the case of greatest interest. For example, with CRRA preferences, the
gross real interest rate, r, would equal gσ/β, the inﬂation rate would equal 1/r, and seignorage losses would
equal [r/g − 1](Mt/Pt), where g is the growth rate of output and σ is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
113 Money Demand, Fiscal Policy and the Optimal Rate
of Inﬂation
Thus far, we have studied an economy in which the ﬁscal authority has access to lump-
sum taxes. In this section, we drop the assumption of lump-sum taxation and replace
it with the, perhaps more realistic, assumption of distortionary income taxation. In this
environment, the policymaker potentially faces a tradeoﬀ between using regular taxes and
printing money to ﬁnance public outlays. In a provoking paper, Phelps (1973) suggested
that when the government does not have access to lump-sum taxes but only to distortionary
tax instruments, then the inﬂation tax should also be used as part of an optimal taxation
scheme. The central result reviewed in this section is that, contrary to Phelps’ conjecture,
the optimality of negative inﬂation is unaltered by the introduction of public spending and
distortionary income taxation.
The optimality of the Friedman rule (and thus of negative inﬂation) in the context of
an optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy problem has been intensively studied. It was derived
by Kimbrough (1986), Guidotti and V´ egh (1993), and Correia and Teles (1996,1999) in a
shopping time economy, by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991) in a model with a cash-in-
advance constraint, by Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996) in a money-in-the-utility function
model, and by Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b) in a model with a consumption-based
transactions cost technology like the one considered here.
The setup of this section deviates from the one considered in the previous section in
three dimensions: First, the government no longer has access to lump-sum taxes. Instead,
we assume that taxes are proportional to labor income. Formally,
τt = τ
h
t wtht,
where τh
t denotes the labor income tax rate. With this type of distortionary taxes, the labor
supply equation (6) changes to
−
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
=
(1 − τh
t )wt
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
. (13)
According to this expression, increases in the labor income tax rate and in velocity distort
the labor supply decision of households in the same way, by inducing them to demand more
leisure and less consumption.
A second departure from the model presented in the previous section is that government
purchases are positive. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the government faces an exogenous
12sequence of public spending {gt}∞
t=0. As a result, the aggregate resource constraint becomes
[1 + s(vt)]ct + gt = F(ht). (14)
Implicit in this speciﬁcation is the assumption that the government’s consumption transac-
tions are not subject to a monetary friction like the one imposed on private purchases of
goods. Finally, unlike the model in the previous section, we now assume that public debt is
not restricted to be zero at all times. The government’s sequential budget constraint now
takes the form
Mt + Bt = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Ptgt − Ptτ
h
t wtht. (15)
A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences {vt, ct, ht, Mt, Bt, Pt}∞
t=0 satisfying (2),
(4) holding with equality, (5), (7), (8), (11), and (13)-(15), given policies {Rt,τh
t }∞
t=0, the
exogenous process {gt}∞
t=0, and the initial condition M−1 + R−1B−1.
As in the previous section, our primary goal is to characterize the Ramsey optimal rate of
inﬂation. To this end, we begin by deriving the primal form of the competitive equilibrium.
Then we state the Ramsey problem. And ﬁnally we characterize optimal ﬁscal and monetary
policy.
3.1 The Primal Form of the Competitive Equilibrium
Following a long-standing tradition in Public Finance, we study optimal policy using the
primal-form representation of the competitive equilibrium. Finding the primal form involves
the elimination of all prices and tax rates from the equilibrium conditions, so that the re-
sulting reduced form involves only real variables. In our economy, the real variables that
appear in the primal form are consumption, hours, and money velocity. The primal form of
the equilibrium conditions consists of two equations. One equation is a feasibility constraint,
given by the resource constraint (14), which must hold at every date. The other equation
is a single, present-value constraint known as the implementability constraint. The imple-
mentability constraint guarantees that at the prices and quantities associated with every
possible competitive equilibrium, the present discounted value of consolidated government
surpluses equals the government’s total initial liabilities.
Formally, sequences {ct,h t,v t}∞
t=0 satisfying the feasibility condition (14), which we repeat
here for convenience,
[1 + s(vt)]ct + gt = F(ht),
13and the implementability constraint
∞ X
t=0
β
t
￿
Uc(ct,h t)ct + Uh(ct,h t)ht +
Uc(ct,h t)[F 0(ht)ht − F(ht)]
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
￿
=
Uc(c0,h 0)
1+s(v0)+v0s0(v0)
R−1B−1 + M−1
P0
,
(16)
vt ≥ v and v
2
ts
0(vt) < 1,
given (R−1B−1 + M−1) and P0, are the same as those satisfying the set of equilibrium
conditions (2), (4) holding with equality, (5), (7), (8), (11), and (13)-(15). Appendix 12.1
presents the proof of this statement.
3.2 Optimality of the Friedman Rule with Distortionary Taxation
The Ramsey problem consists in choosing a set of strictly positive sequences {ct,h t,v t}∞
t=0
to maximize the utility function (1) subject to (14), (16), vt ≥ v, and v2
ts0(vt) < 1, given
R−1B−1 + M−1 > 0 and P0. We ﬁx the initial price level arbitrarily to keep the Ramsey
planner from engineering a large unexpected initial inﬂation aimed at reducing the real value
of predetermined nominal government liabilities. This assumption is regularly maintained
in the literature on optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy.
We now establish that the Friedman rule is optimal (and hence the optimal rate of in-
ﬂation is negative) under the assumption that the production technology is linear in hours,
that is, F(ht)=Aht, where A>0 is a parameter. In this case, wage payments exhaust
output and ﬁrms make zero proﬁts. This is the case typically studied in the related literature
(e.g., Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1991). With linear production, the implementability
constraint (16) becomes independent of money velocity, vt, for all t>0. Our strategy to
characterize optimal monetary policy is to consider ﬁrst the solution to a less constrained
problem that ignores the requirement v2
ts0(vt) < 1, and then to verify that the obtained solu-
tion indeed satisﬁes this requirement. Accordingly, letting ψt denote the Lagrange multiplier
on the feasibility constraint (14), the ﬁrst-order condition of the (less constrained) Ramsey
problem with respect to vt for any t>0i s
ψtcts
0(vt)(vt − v)=0 ; vt ≥ v; ψtcts
0(vt) ≥ 0. (17)
Recalling that, by our maintained assumptions regarding the form of the transactions cost
technology, s0(v) vanishes at v = v, it follows immediately that vt = v solves this optimality
condition. The omitted constraint v2
ts0(vt) < 1 is also clearly satisﬁed at vt = v, since
s0(v)=0 .
From the liquidity preference function (5), it then follows that Rt = 1 for all dates t>0.
14Finally, because the Ramsey optimality conditions are static and because our economy is
deterministic, the Ramsey-optimal sequences of consumption and hours are constant. It
then follows from the Fisher equation (7) that the inﬂation rate πt −1 is negative and equal
to β − 1 for all t>1.
Taking stock, in this section we set out to study the robustness of the optimality of
negative inﬂation to the introduction of a ﬁscal motive for inﬂationary ﬁnance. We did so by
assuming that the government must ﬁnance an exogenous stream of government spending
with distortionary taxes. The main result of this section is that, in contrast to Phelps’s
conjecture, negative inﬂation emerges as optimal even in an environment in which the only
source of revenue available to the government, other than seignorage revenue, is distortionary
income taxation. Remarkably, the optimality of the Friedman rule obtains independently of
the ﬁnancing needs of the government, embodied in the size of government spending, gt, and
of initial liabilities of the government, (R−1B−1 + M−1)/P0.
A key characteristic of the economic environment studied here that is responsible for
the ﬁnding that an inﬂation tax is suboptimal is the absence of untaxed income. In the
present framework, with linear production and perfect competition, a labor income tax is
equivalent to a tax on the entire gross domestic product. The next section shows, by means
of three examples, that when income taxation is incomplete in the sense that it fails to
apply uniformly to all sources of income, positive inﬂation may become optimal as a way to
partially restore complete taxation.
4 Failure of the Friedman Rule Due to Untaxed In-
come: Three Examples
When the government is unable to optimally tax all sources of income, positive inﬂation may
be a desirable instrument to tax the part of income that is suboptimally taxed. The reason
is that because at some point all types of private income are devoted to consumption, and
because inﬂation acts as a tax on consumption, a positive nominal interest rate represents
an indirect way to tax all sources of income. We illustrate this principle by means of three
examples. In two examples ﬁrms make pure proﬁts. In one case, pure proﬁts emerge because
of decreasing returns to scale in production, and in the other case they are the result of im-
perfect competition in product markets. In both cases, there is incomplete taxation because
the government cannot tax proﬁts at the optimal rate. In the third example, untaxed income
stems from tax evasion. In this case, a deviation from the Friedman rule emerges as optimal
because, unlike regular taxes, the inﬂation tax cannot be evaded.
154.1 Decreasing Returns to Scale
In the model analyzed thus far, suppose that the production technology F(h) exhibits de-
creasing returns to scale, that is, F 00(h) < 0. In this case, the ﬁrst-order condition of the
Ramsey problem with respect to vt for any t>0 is given by
µt(vt − v)=0 ; vt ≥ v; µt ≥ 0; ξt(1 − v
2
ts
0(vt)) = 0; v
2
ts
0(vt) < 1; ξt ≥ 0,
where
µt ≡ ψtcts
0(vt)+λUc(ct,h t)[F
0(ht)ht − F(ht)]
2s0(vt)+vts00(vt)
[1 + s(vt)+vts0(vt)]2 + ξt[2vts
0(vt)+v
2
ts
00(vt)].
As before, ψt denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint (14),
λ>0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the implementability constraint (16),
and ξt denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint v2
ts0(vt) < 1. The
satiation level of velocity, v, does not represent a solution of this optimality condition. The
reason is that at vt = v the variable µt is negative, violating the optimality condition µt ≥ 0.
To see this, note that µt is the sum of three terms. The ﬁrst term of µt, ψtcts0(vt), is zero
at vt = v because s0(v) = 0. Similarly, the third term of µt, ξt[2vts0(vt)+v2
ts00(vt)], is zero
because ξt is zero, as the constraint 1 − v2
ts0(vt) does not bind at v. Finally, the second
term of µt, λUc(ct,h t)[F 0(ht)ht − F(ht)]
2s0(vt)+vts00(vt)
[1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)]2, is negative. This is because under
decreasing returns to scale F 0(ht)ht − F(ht) is negative, and because under the maintained
assumptions regarding the form of the transactions technology s00(v) is strictly positive at v.3
As a consequence, the Friedman rule fails to be Ramsey optimal, and the Ramsey equilibrium
features a positive nominal interest rate and inﬂation exceeding β.
The factor F(h)−F 0(h)h, which is in part responsible for the failure of the Friedman rule,
represents pure proﬁts accruing to the owners of ﬁrms. These proﬁts are not taxed under the
assumed labor income tax regime. We interpret the ﬁnding of a positive opportunity cost of
holding money under the Ramsey optimal policy as an indirect way for the government to tax
proﬁts. One can show that if the government were able to tax proﬁts either at the same rate
as labor income or at a hundred percent—which is indeed the Ramsey optimal rate—then
the Friedman rule would reemerge as the optimal monetary policy (see Schmitt-Groh´ e and
Uribe, 2004b). Similarly, the Friedman rule is optimal if one assumes that, in addition to
3One may argue that the assumption 2s0(v)+vs00(v) > 0 for all v ≥ v, which implies that the nominal
interest rate is a strictly increasing function of v for all v ≥ v and, in particular, that the elasticity of the
liquidity preference function at a zero nominal interest rate is ﬁnite, is too restrictive. Suppose instead that
the assumption in question is relaxed by assuming that it must hold only for v>vbut not at v = v.I n
this case, a potential solution to the ﬁrst-order condition of the Ramsey problem with respect to vt is v = v
provided s00(v)=0 .
16labor income taxes, the government has access to consumption taxes (see Correia, Nicolini,
and Teles, 2008).
As an illustration of the inﬂation bias introduced by the assumption of decreasing returns
to scale, we numerically solve for the Ramsey allocation in a parameterized, calibrated
version of the model. We adopt the numerical solution method developed in Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2004b), which delivers an exact numerical solution to the Ramsey problem. We
adopt the following forms for the period utility function, the production function, and the
transactions cost technology:
U(c,h)=l n ( c)+θ ln(1 − h); θ>0, (18)
F(h)=h
α; α ∈ (0,1], (19)
and
s(v)=Av + B/v − 2
√
AB. (20)
The assumed transactions cost function implies that the satiation level of velocity is v =
p
B/A and a demand for money of the form
Mt
Pt
=
ct q
B
A + 1
A
Rt−1
Rt
.
We set β =1 /1.04, θ =2 .90,A=0 .0111,B=0 .07524,g t =0 .04 for all t, which implies
a share of government spending of about 20 percent prior to the adoption of the Ramsey
policy, and (M−1+R−1B−1)/P0 =0 .13, which amounts to about 62 percent of GDP prior to
the adoption of the Ramsey policy. For more details of the calibration strategy see Schmitt-
Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b).
Table 2 displays the Ramsey optimal levels of inﬂation and the labor-income tax rate for
a range of values of α between 0.7 and 1. When α equals unity, the production function
exhibits constant returns to scale and the entire output is taxed at the rate τh. This is
the case most commonly studied in the literature. The table shows that in this case, the
Friedman rule is optimal and implies deﬂation at 3.85 percent. As the curvature of the
production function increases, the untaxed fraction of GDP, given by 1 − α, also increases,
inducing the Ramsey planner to use inﬂation as an indirect tax on this portion of output.
The table shows that as the untaxed fraction of output increases from 0 (α = 1) to 30 percent
(α =0 .7), the Ramsey-optimal rate of inﬂation rises from -3.85 percent to -2.6 percent.
If one believes that at most 10 percent of the GDP of developed economies goes untaxed,
then the value of α that is reasonable for the question being analyzed here, would be about
17Table 2: Decreasing Return to Scale, Imperfect Competition, Tax Evasion and Deviations
from the Friedman Rule
Decreasing Returns Monopolistic Competition Tax Evasion
Labor Share Markup Underground
απ τ h η
1+η πτ h Share, ¯ u
y πτ h
1.00 -3.85 17.99 1.00 -3.85 17.99 0.00 -3.85 17.99
0.99 -3.82 18.08 1.05 -3.65 19.74 0.06 -3.65 19.21
0.95 -3.70 18.42 1.10 -3.32 21.55 0.12 -3.37 20.62
0.90 -3.53 18.87 1.15 -2.83 23.42 0.18 -2.94 22.28
0.85 -3.33 19.34 1.20 -2.12 25.36 0.24 -2.20 24.29
0.80 -3.11 19.84 1.25 -1.11 27.35 0.31 -0.71 26.74
0.75 -2.86 20.36 1.30 0.40 29.38 0.38 3.31 29.60
0.70 -2.58 20.91 1.35 2.71 31.41 0.46 20.02 31.38
Note: π and R denote, respectively the net rates of inﬂation and interest rate
expressed in percent per annum.
0.9. This value of α implies an inﬂation bias of about 30 basis points. We interpret this
ﬁnding as suggesting that the inﬂation bias introduced by the presence of untaxed output
in the decreasing-returns model provides a poor explanation for the actual inﬂation targets,
of 2 percent or higher, adopted by central banks around the world.
4.2 Imperfect Competition
Even if the production technologies available to ﬁrms exhibit constant returns to scale, pure
proﬁts may result in equilibrium if product markets are imperfectly competitive. If, in
addition, the government is unable to fully tax pure monopoly proﬁts or unable tax them
at the same rate as it taxes labor income, then deviating from the Friedman rule may be
desirable. This case is analyzed in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b).
To introduce imperfect competition, we modify the model studied in subsection 4.1 by
assuming that consumption is a composite good made from a continuum of diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods via a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Each intermediate good is produced by
a monopolistically competitive ﬁrm that operates a linear technology, F(h)=h, and that
faces a demand function with constant price elasticity η<−1. It can be shown that the
only equilibrium condition that changes vis-` a-vis the model developed earlier in this section
is the labor demand function (8), that now becomes
F
0(ht)=
η
1+η
wt, (21)
18where η/(1 + η) > 1 denotes the gross markup of prices over marginal cost.
A competitive equilibrium in the imperfect-competition economy is a set of sequences
{vt, ct, ht, Mt, Bt, Pt}∞
t=0 satisfying (2), (4) holding with equality, (5), (7), (11), (13)-(15),
and (21), given policies {Rt,τh
t }∞
t=0, the exogenous process {gt}∞
t=0, and the initial condition
M−1 + R−1B−1.
The primal form of the competitive equilibrium is identical to the one given in section
3.1, with the implementability constraint (16) replaced by:4
∞ X
t=0
β
t
￿
Uc(ct,h t)ct + Uh(ct,h t)ht +
Uc(ct,h t)
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
ht
η
￿
=
Uc(c0,h 0)
1+s(v0)+v0s0(v0)
R−1B−1 + M−1
P0
.
(22)
This implementability constraint is closely related to the one that results in the case of
decreasing returns to scale. In eﬀect, the factor ht/(−η), which appears in the above ex-
pression, represents pure proﬁts accruing to the monopolists in the present economy. In the
economy with decreasing returns, proﬁts also appear in the implementability constraint in
the form F(ht) − F 0(ht)ht. It should therefore come at no surprise that under imperfect
competition the Ramsey planner will have an incentive to inﬂate above the level called for
by the Friedman rule as a way to levy an indirect tax on pure proﬁts. To see this more
formally, we present the ﬁrst-order condition of the Ramsey problem with respect to money
velocity for any t>0, which is given by
µt(vt − v)=0 ; vt ≥ v; µt ≥ 0; ξt(1 − v
2
ts
0(vt)) = 0; v
2
ts
0(vt) < 1; ξt ≥ 0,
where
µt ≡ ψtcts
0(vt)+λ
Uc(ct,h t)
η
2s0(vt)+vts00(vt)
[1 + s(vt)+vts0(vt)]2 + ξt[2vts
0(vt)+v
2
ts
00(vt)].
Noting that η<0, it follows by the same arguments presented in the case of decreasing
returns to scale that the satiation level of velocity, v, does not represent a solution to this
ﬁrst-order condition. The Friedman rule fails to be Ramsey optimal and the optimal rate of
inﬂation exceeds β.
The middle panel of table 2 presents the Ramsey optimal policy choices for inﬂation
and the labor tax rate in the imperfectly competitive model for diﬀerent values of the gross
markup of prices over marginal cost, η/(1 + η). All other structural parameters take the
same value as before. The case of perfect competition corresponds to a markup of unity. In
4The proof of this statement is similar to the one presented in appendix 12.1. For a detailed derivation
see Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b).
19this case, the Friedman rule is optimal and the associated inﬂation rate is -3.85 percent. For
positive values of the markup, the optimal interest rate increases and so does the optimal
level of inﬂation. Empirical studies, for example, Basu and Fernald (1997), indicate that in
postwar U.S. data value-added markups are at most 25 percent—which according to table 2
would be associated with an optimal inﬂation rate of only -1.11 percent. This inﬂation rate
is far below the inﬂation targets of 2 percent or higher maintained by central banks. To
obtain an optimal rate of inﬂation that is in line with observed central bank targets our
calibrated model would require a markup exceeding 30 percent, which is on high end of
empirical estimates.
The reason why in this model a high level of markup induces a high optimal rate of inﬂa-
tion is that a high markup generates large proﬁts that the Ramsey planner taxes indirectly
with the inﬂation tax. For instance a markup of 35 percent is associated with a proﬁt share
of 25 percent of GDP. Again this number seems unrealistically high. Any mechanism that
would either reduce the size of the proﬁt share, such as ﬁxed costs of production, or reduce
the amount of proﬁts distributed to households, such as proﬁt taxes, would result in lower
optimal rates of inﬂation. For instance, if proﬁts were taxed at a 100% rate, or if the proﬁt
tax rate were set equal to the labor income tax rate, τh
t , (i.e., if the tax system consisted
in a proportional income tax rate), the Friedman rule would reemerge as Ramsey optimal.
(See Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2004b.)
4.3 Tax Evasion
Our third example of how the Friedman rule breaks in the presence of an incomplete tax
system is perhaps the most direct illustration of this principle. In this example, there is
an underground economy in which ﬁrms evade income taxes. The failure of the Friedman
due to tax evasion is studied in Nicolini (1998) in the context of a cash in advance model
with consumption taxes. To maintain continuity with our previous analysis, here we embed
an underground sector in our transaction cost model with income taxation. Speciﬁcally,
we modify the model of section 3 by assuming that ﬁrms can hide an amount ut of output
from the tax authority, which implies that the income tax rate applies only to the amount
F(ht) − ut. Thus, the variable ut is a measure of the size of the underground economy. The
maximization problem of the ﬁrm is then given by
F(ht) − wtht − τt[F(ht) − ut].
20We allow the size of the underground economy to vary with the level of aggregate activity
by assuming that ut is the following function of ht
ut = u(ht).
The ﬁrst-order condition associated with the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem is
F
0(ht)=wt + τt[F
0(ht) − u
0(ht)]
This expression shows that the presence of the underground economy makes the labor input
marginally cheaper in the amount τtu0(ht).
All other aspects of the economy are assumed to be identical to those of the economy of
section 3 without income taxation at the level of the household. We restrict attention to the
case of a linearly homogeneous production technology of the form F(h)=h. It follows that
when the size of the underground economy is zero (ut = 0 for all t), the economy collapses
to that of section 3 and the optimal inﬂation rate is the one associated with the Friedman
rule.
When the size of the underground economy is not zero, one can show that the Ramsey
problem consists in maximizing the lifetime utility function (1) subject to the feasibility
constraint
[1 + s(vt)]ct + gt = ht,
the implementability constraint
∞ X
t=0
β
t
￿
Uc(ct,h t)ct + Uh(ct,h t)ht −
u(ht) − u0(ht)ht
1 − u0(ht)
￿
Uc(ct,h t)
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
+ Uh(ct,h t)
￿￿
=
Uc(c0,h 0)
1+s(v0)+v0s0(v0)
R−1B−1 + M−1
P0
and the following familiar restrictions on money velocity
vt ≥ v and v
2
ts
0(vt) < 1,
given (R−1B−1 + M−1) and P0.
Letting ψt > 0 denote the Lagrange multiplier on the feasibility constraint, λ>0 the
Lagrange multiplier on the implementability constraint, and µt the Lagrange multiplier on
the constraint vt ≥ v, the ﬁrst-order condition of the Ramsey problem with respect to vt is
21given by
µt = ψts
0(vt)ct − λ
u(ht) − u0(ht)ht
1 − u0(ht)
Uc(ct,h t)
[1 + s(vt)+vts0(vt)]2[2s
0(vt)+vts
00(vt)], (23)
where µt satisﬁes
µt ≥ 0, and µt(vt − v)=0 . (24)
In deriving these conditions, we do not include in the Lagrangean the constraint vts0(vt) < 1,
so one must verify its satisfaction separately.
Consider two polar cases regarding the form of the function u, linking the level of ag-
gregate activity and the size of the underground economy. One case assumes that u is
homogeneous of degree one. In this case, we have that u(h) − u0(h)h = 0 and the above
optimality conditions collapse to
ψts
0(vt)ct(vt − v)=0 ,v t ≥ v,ψ tcts
0(vt) ≥ 0.
This expression is identical to (17). We have established that, given our assumption regarding
the form of the transaction cost technology s, optimality condition (17) can only be satisﬁed
if vt = v. That is, the only solution to the Ramsey problem is the Friedman rule. The
intuition for this result is that when the underground economy is proportional to the above-
ground economy, a proportional tax on the above-ground output is also a proportional tax
on total output. Thus, from a ﬁscal point of view, it is as if there was no untaxed income.
The second polar case assumes that the size of the underground economy is independent
of the level of aggregate activity, that is, u(ht)=¯ u, where ¯ u>0 is a parameter. In this
case, when vt equals v, optimality condition (23) implies that µt = −λ¯ uUc(ct,h t)vs00(v) < 0,
violating optimality condition (24). It follows that the Friedman rule ceases to be Ramsey
optimal. The intuition behind this result is that in this case ﬁrms operating in the under-
ground economy enjoy a pure rent given by the amount of taxes that they manage to evade.
The base of the evaded taxes is perfectly inelastic with respect to both the tax rate and
inﬂation, and given by ¯ u. The government attempts to indirectly tax these pure rents by
imposing an inﬂation tax on consumption.
The failure of the Friedman rule in the presence of an underground sector holds more
generally. For instance, the result obtains when the function u is homogeneous of any degree
φ less than unity. To see this note that in this case, when vt = v, equation (23) becomes
µt = −λ
u(ht)(1−φ)
1−φu(ht)/htUc(ct,h t)vs00(v) < 0. In turn, the negativity of µt contradicts optimality
condition (24). Consequently, vt must be larger than v and the Friedman rule fails to hold.
The right panel of table 2 present the Ramsey optimal inﬂation rate and labor income tax
22rate as a function of share of the underground sector in total output. In these calculations
we assume that the size of the underground economy is insensitive to changes in output
(u0(h) = 0). All other functional forms and parameter values are as assumed in section 4.1.
Nicolini (1998) reports estimates for the size of the underground economy in the U.S. of
at most 10 percent. The table shows that for a share of underground economy of this
magnitude the optimal rate of inﬂation is only 50 basis points above the one associated with
the Friedman rule. This implies that in the context of this model tax evasion provides little
incentives for the monetary authority to inﬂate.
The conclusion we derive from the analysis of these three examples is that it is diﬃcult, if
not impossible, to explain observed inﬂation targets as the outcome of an optimal monetary
and ﬁscal policy problem through the lens of a model in which the incentives to inﬂate stem
from the desire to mend an ill conceived tax system.
In the next section we present an example in which the Ramsey planner has an incentive
to inﬂate that is purely monetary in nature and unrelated to ﬁscal policy considerations.
5 A Foreign Demand For Domestic Currency and the
Optimal Rate of Inﬂation
More than half of U.S. currency circulates abroad. Porter and Judson (1996), for instance,
estimate that at the end of 1995 $200 to $250 billion of the $375 billion of U.S. currency
in circulation outside of banks was held abroad. The foreign demand for U.S. currency
has remained strong across time. The 2006 Treasury, Federal Reserve, and Secret Service
report on the use of U.S. currency abroad, issued a decade after the publication of Porter
and Judson, estimates that as of December 2005 about $450 billion of the $760 billion of
circulated U.S. banknotes are held in other countries.
The estimated size of the foreign demand for U.S. currency suggests that much of the
seignorage income of the United States is generated outside of its borders. A natural question
is therefore whether a country’s optimal rate of inﬂation is inﬂuenced by the presence of a
foreign demand for its currency. In this section we address this issue within the context
of a dynamic Ramsey problem. We show that the mere existence of a foreign demand for
domestic money can, under plausible parameterizations, justify sizable deviations from the
rate of inﬂation associated with the Friedman rule. The basic intuition behind this ﬁnding
is that adherence to the negative rate of inﬂation associated with the Friedman rule would
represent a welfare-decreasing transfer of real resources by the domestic economy to the
rest of the world, as nominal money balances held abroad increase in real terms at the rate
23of deﬂation. A benevolent government weighs this cost against the beneﬁt of keeping the
opportunity cost of holding money low to reduce transactions costs for domestic agents. Our
analytical results show that this tradeoﬀ is resolved in favor of deviating from the Friedman
rule. Indeed, our quantitative analysis suggests that for plausible calibrations the optimal
rate of inﬂation is positive. The question of how a foreign demand for money aﬀects the
optimal rate of inﬂation is studied in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2009a. We follow this paper
closely in this section.
5.1 The Model
We consider a variation of the constant-returns-to-scale, perfectly-competitive, monetary
economy of section 3 augmented with a foreign demand for domestic currency. Speciﬁcally,
assume that the foreign demand for real domestic currency, M
f
t /Pt, is a function of the level
of foreign aggregate activity, denoted y
f
t , and the domestic nominal interest rate. Formally,
the foreign demand for domestic currency is implicitly given by
(v
f
t )
2˜ s
0(v
f
t )=
Rt − 1
Rt
, (25)
where v
f
t is deﬁned as
v
f
t =
Pty
f
t
M
f
t
. (26)
The transactions cost technology ˜ s is assumed to satisfy the same properties as the domestic
transactions cost function s.
As in previous sections, we assume that the government prints money, issues nominal, one-
period bonds, and levies taxes to ﬁnance an exogenous stream of public consumption, denoted
gt, and interest obligations on the outstanding public debt. Accordingly, the government’s
sequential budget constraint is given by
Mt + M
f
t + Bt = Mt−1 + M
f
t−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Ptgt − Ptτ
h
t wtht, (27)
where Mt now denotes the stock of money held domestically. Combining this expression
with the the household’s sequential budget constraint, given by Ptct[1 + s(vt)] + Mt + Bt =
Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1 + Pt(1 − τh
t )wtht yields the following aggregate resource constraint
[1 + s(vt)]ct + gt = F(ht)+
M
f
t − M
f
t−1
Pt
, (28)
where we are using the fact that with perfect competition in product markets and a constant
24returns to scale production function wtht = F(ht). It is clear from this resource constraint
that the domestic economy collects seignorage revenue from foreigners whenever nominal
money balances held by foreigners increase, that is, whenever M
f
t >M
f
t−1. This would hap-
pen in an inﬂationary environment characterized by a constant foreign demand for domestic
real balances. Conversely, the domestic economy transfers real resources to the rest of the
world whenever the foreign demand for domestic currency shrinks (M
f
t <M
f
t−1), as would
be the case in a deﬂationary economy facing a constant foreign demand for domestic real
balances.
A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences {vt, wt, v
f
t , ct, ht, Mt, M
f
t , Bt, Pt}∞
t=0
satisfying (2), (4) holding with equality, (5), (7), (8), (11), (13), and (25)-(28), given policies
{Rt,τh
t }∞
t=0, the exogenous sequences {gt,y
f
t }∞
t=0, and the initial conditions M−1+R−1B−1 > 0
and M
f
−1.
To characterize the optimal rate of inﬂation it is convenient to ﬁrst derive the primal
form of the competitive equilibrium. Given the initial conditions (R−1B−1 +M−1) and M
f
−1
and the initial price level P0, sequences {ct,h t,v t}∞
t=0 satisfy the feasibility condition
[1 + s(v0)]c0 + g0 = F(h0)+
y
f
0
χ(v0)
−
M
f
−1
P0
(29)
in period 0 and
[1+s(vt)]ct+gt = F(ht)+
y
f
t
χ(vt)
−
y
f
t−1
χ(vt−1)
￿
1 − v
2
t−1s
0(vt−1)
￿ Uc(ct−1,h t−1)
γ(vt−1)
γ(vt)
βUc(ct,h t)
, (30)
for all t>0, the implementability constraint
∞ X
t=0
β
t {Uc(ct,h t)ct + Uh(ct,h t)ht} =
Uc(c0,h 0)
1+s(v0)+v0s0(v0)
R−1B−1 + M−1
P0
, (31)
and
vt ≥ v and v
2
ts
0(vt) < 1,
if and only if they also satisfy the set of equilibrium conditions (2), (4) holding with equality,
(5), (7), (8), (11), (13), and (25)-(28), where the function
v
f
t = χ(vt) (32)
is implicitly deﬁned by v2s0(v) − (vf)2˜ s0(vf) = 0. Appendix 12.2 presents the proof of this
statement of the primal form of the competitive equilibrium.
255.2 Failure of the Friedman Rule
The government is assumed to be benevolent towards domestic residents. This means that
the welfare function of the government coincides with the lifetime utility of the domestic
representative agent, and that it is independent of the level of utility of foreign residents. The
Ramsey problem then consists in choosing a set of strictly positive sequences {ct,h t,v t}∞
t=0
to maximize the utility function (1) subject to (29)-(31), vt ≥ v, and v2
ts0(vt) < 1, given
R−1B−1 + M−1, M
f
−1, and P0.
To simplify notation express the feasibility constraint (30) as H(ct,c t−1,h t,h t−1,v t,v t−1)=
0 and the implementability constraint (31) as
P∞
t=0 βtK(ct,h t)=A(c0,h 0,v 0). Let the La-
grange multiplier on the feasibility constraint (30) be denoted by ψt, the Lagrange multiplier
on the implementability constraint (31) be denoted by λ, and the Lagrange multiplier on
the constraint vt ≥ v be denoted by µt. Then, for any t>0, the ﬁrst-order conditions of the
Ramsey problem are
Uc(ct,h t)+λKc(ct,h t)+ψtH1(ct,c t−1,h t,h t−1,v t,v t−1)+βψt+1H2(ct+1,c t,h t+1,h t,v t+1,v t)=0
(33)
Uh(ct,h t)+λKh(ct,h t)+ψtH3(ct,c t−1,h t,h t−1,v t,v t−1)+βψt+1H4(ct+1,c t,h t+1,h t,v t+1,v t)=0
(34)
ψtH5(ct,c t−1,h t,h t−1,v t,v t−1)+βψt+1H6(ct+1,c t,h t+1,h t,v t+1,v t)+µt =0 , (35)
(vt − v)µt =0 ; µt ≥ 0; vt ≥ v. (36)
We do not include the constraint v2
ts0(vt) < 1 in the Lagrangean. Therefore, we must check
that the solution to the above system satisﬁes this constraint.
Because this economy collapses to the one studied in section 3 when the foreign demand
for domestic currency is nil, i.e., when y
f
t = 0, it follows immediately that in this case the
Friedman rule is Ramsey optimal. We ﬁrst establish analytically that the Friedman rule
ceases to be Ramsey optimal in the presence of a foreign demand for domestic currency, i.e.,
when y
f
t > 0. To facilitate the exposition, as in previous sections, we restrict attention to
the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. That is, we restrict attention to solutions to
(30) and (33)-(36) in which the endogenous variables ct, ht, vt, ψt and µt are constant given
constant levels for the exogenous variables gt and y
f
t . Further, absent an estimate of the
foreign demand for domestic currency, throughout this section, we assume that χ(v)=v,
which implies identical relationships between the nominal interest rate and domestic-money
velocity in the domestic and the foreign economies. To establish the failure of the Friedman
rule when y
f
t > 0, we show that a Ramsey equilibrium in which vt equals v is impossible. In
26the steady state, the optimality condition (35) when evaluated at vt = v becomes:
ψ
yf
χ(v)
s
00(v)v
￿
1 −
1
β
+ v
￿
+ µ =0 .
For the reasons given in section 3 the Lagrange multiplier ψ is positive. Under our main-
tained assumptions regarding the transactions cost technology, s00(v) is also positive.5 Under
reasonable calibrations, the constant 1/β−1, which equals the steady-state real interest rate,
is smaller than the velocity level v. Then, the ﬁrst term in the above sum is positive. This
implies that the multiplier µ must be negative, which violates optimality condition (36).
We conclude that in the presence of a foreign demand for domestic currency, if a Ramsey
equilibrium exists, it involves a deviation from the Friedman rule.
The intuition behind this result is that the presence of a foreign demand for domestic
currency introduces an incentive for the ﬁscal authority to inﬂate in order to extract re-
sources, in the form of seignorage, from the rest of the world (whose welfare does not enter
the domestic planner’s objective function). Indeed, at any negative inﬂation rate (and, most
so at the level of inﬂation consistent with the Friedman rule), the domestic country actually
derives negative seignorage income from the rest of the world, because foreign money hold-
ings increase in real value as the price level falls. On the other hand, levying an inﬂation
tax on foreign money holdings comes at the cost of taxing domestic money holdings as well.
In turn, the domestic inﬂation tax entails a welfare loss, because domestic households must
pay elevated transaction costs as they are forced to economize on real balances. Thus, the
Ramsey planner faces a tradeoﬀ between taxing foreign money holdings and imposing trans-
action costs on domestic residents. We have demonstrated analytically that the resolution
of this tradeoﬀ leads to an inﬂation rate above the one called for by Friedman’s rule. We
now turn to the question of how large the optimal deviation from the Friedman rule is under
a plausible calibration of our model.
5.3 Quantifying the Optimal Deviation from the Friedman Rule
To gauge the quantitative implications of a foreign demand for money for the optimal rate
of inﬂation, we parameterize the model and solve numerically for the steady state of the
Ramsey equilibrium. We adopt the functional form given in equation (18) for the period
utility function and the functional form given in equation (20) for the transactions cost
technology. As in section 3, we set β =1 /1.04, θ =2 .90, B =0 .07524, and gt =0 .04 for
all t. We set yf =0 .06 and A =0 .0056 to match the empirical regularities that about 50
5But see the discussion in footnote 3.
27Table 3: Ramsey Policy with Foreign Demand for Domestic Currency
Mf
Mf+M
Mf+M
Pc πR τ h
No Foreign Demand: yf = 0 0.00 0.27 -3.85 0.00 17.56
Baseline Calibration: yf =0 .06 0.22 0.26 2.10 6.18 16.15
Higher Foreign Demand: yf =0 .1 0.32 0.24 10.52 14.94 14.64
Low Domestic Demand: A =0 .0014 0.22 0.13 2.11 6.19 16.33
High Interest Elasticity: B =0 .0376 0.22 0.37 -0.96 3.00 16.95
High Debt-to-Output Ratio: B
Py =0 .50 0.22 0.26 2.21 6.30 17.50
Lump-Sum Taxes 0.20 0.27 0.85 4.88 0.00
Lump-Sum Taxes and gt = 0 0.19 0.27 0.59 4.62 —
Note: The baseline calibration is: A=0.0056, B=0.07524, B
Py =0 .2, yf =0 .06.
The interest rate, R, and the inﬂation rate, π, are expressed in percent per
annum, and the income tax rate, τh, is expressed in percent.
percent of U.S. currency (or about 26 percent of M1) is held outside of the United States
and that the M1-to-consumption ratio is about 29 percent. Finally, to make the Ramsey
steady state in the absence of a foreign demand for money approximately equal to the one
of the economy considered in section 3, we set the level of debt in the Ramsey steady state
to 20 percent of GDP. This debt level implies that the pre-Ramsey reform debt-to-output
ratio in the economy without a foreign demand for domestic currency and with a pre-reform
inﬂation rate of 4.2 percent is about 44 percent. The reason why the Ramsey steady-state
level of debt is much lower than the pre-Ramsey-reform level is that the reform induces a
drop in expected inﬂation of about 8 percent, which causes a large asset substitution away
from government bonds and toward real money balances. The overall level of government
liabilities (money plus bonds) is relatively unaﬀected by the Ramsey reform.
We develop a numerical algorithm that delivers the exact solution to the steady state of
the Ramsey equilibrium. The mechanics of the algorithm are as follows: (1) Pick a positive
value of λ. (2) Given this value of λ solve the nonlinear system (30) and (33)-(36) for c, h,
v, ψ, and µ. (3) Calculate w from (8), τh from (13), R from (5), π from (7), vf from (32),
Mt/Pt from (2), and M
f
t /Pt from (26). (4) Calculate the steady-state debt-to-output ratio,
which we denote by sd ≡ Bt/(Ptyt), from (27), taking into account that y = h. (5) If sd is
larger than the calibrated value of 0.2, lower λ. If, instead, sd is smaller than the calibrated
value of 0.2, then increase the value of λ. (6) Repeat steps (1)-(5) until sd has converged to
its calibrated value.
Table 3 presents our numerical results. The ﬁrst line of the table shows that when foreign
demand for domestic currency is nil, which we capture by setting yf = 0, then as we have
28shown analytically in section 3, the Friedman rule is Ramsey optimal, that is, the nominal
interest rate is zero in the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium. The inﬂation rate is -3.85
percent and the income tax rate is about 18 percent. In this case, because the foreign demand
for domestic currency is nil, the domestic government has no incentives to levy an inﬂation
tax, as it would generate no revenues from the rest of the world but would hurt domestic
residents by elevating the opportunity costs of holding money. The second row of the table
considers the case that the foreign demand for domestic currency is positive. In particular,
we set yf =0 .06 and obtain that in the Ramsey steady state the ratio of foreign currency
to total money is 22 percent and that total money holdings are 26 percent of consumption.
Both ﬁgures are broadly in line with observations in the U.S. economy. The table shows,
in line with the analytical results obtained above, that the Ramsey optimal rate of interest
is positive, that is, the Friedman rule is no longer optimal. Of greater interest however is
the size of the deviation from the Friedman rule. The table shows that the Ramsey optimal
inﬂation rate is 2.10 percent per year about 6 percentage points higher than the value that
obtains in the absence of a foreign demand for domestic currency. The optimal rate of
interest now is 6.2 percent. When we increase foreign demand for domestic currency by
assuming a larger value of foreign activity, yf =0 .1, then the share of foreign holdings of
domestic currency in total money increases by 10 percentage points to 0.32 and the Ramsey
optimal inﬂation rate is more than 10 percent per year. In this calibration, the beneﬁt from
collecting an inﬂation tax from foreign holdings of currency appears to strongly dominate
the costs that such a high inﬂation tax represents for domestic agents in terms of a more
distorted consumption-leisure choice and elevated transaction costs. The larger inﬂation tax
revenues relax the budget constraint of the government allowing for a decline in the Ramsey
optimal tax rate of about 1.5 percentage points.
Line 4 of table 3 considers a calibration that implies a weaker demand for money both
domestically and abroad. Speciﬁcally, we lower the coeﬃcient A in the transactions cost
function by a factor of 4. Because the demand for money is proportional to the square root
of A, this parameter change implies that the ratio of money to consumption falls by a factor
of two. In the Ramsey steady state, the money-to-consumption ratio falls from 26 to 13
percent. The relative importance of foreign demand for money is unchanged. It continues to
account for 22 percent of total money demand. The optimal rate of inﬂation is virtually the
same as in the baseline case. The reason why the inﬂation tax is virtually unchanged in this
case is that the reduction in A induces proportional declines in both the domestic and the
foreign demands for domestic currency. The decline in foreign money demand is equivalent
to a decline in yf, and therefore induces the Ramsey planner to lower the rate of inﬂation.
At the same time, the decline in the domestic demand for money reduces the cost of inﬂation
29for domestic agents, inducing the Ramsey planner to inﬂate more. In our parameterization,
these two opposing eﬀects happen to oﬀset each other almost exactly.
Line 5 of table 3 analyzes the sensitivity of our results to raising the interest elasticity
of money demand, which we capture by reducing the parameter B of the transaction cost
function to half its baseline value. Under a higher interest elasticity the Ramsey optimal rate
of interest and inﬂation are lower than in the baseline case. The nominal interest rate falls
from 6 to 3 percent and the inﬂation rate falls from about 2 percent to negative 1 percent. In
this case while the Ramsey policy deviates from the Friedman rule, the deviation is not large
enough to render positive inﬂation Ramsey optimal. The last line of the table shows that
our results are very little changed when we increase the steady state debt level. We conclude
from the results presented in table 3 that the tradeoﬀ between collecting seignorage from
foreign holders of domestic currency and keeping the opportunity cost of holding money low
for domestic agents is resolved in favor of collecting seignorage income from foreign holdings
of domestic currency.
5.4 Lump-Sum Taxation
The reason why the benevolent government ﬁnds it desirable to deviate from the Friedman
rule in the presence of a foreign demand for currency is not entirely to ﬁnance its budget
with seignorage revenue extracted from foreign residents. Rather, the government imposes
an inﬂation tax on foreign residents to increase the total amount of resources available to
domestic residents for consumption. To show that this is indeed the correct interpretation
of our results, we now consider a variation of the model in which the government can levy
lump-sum taxes on domestic residents. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the labor income tax
rate τh
t is zero at all times, and that the government sets lump-sum taxes to ensure ﬁscal
solvency. A competitive equilibrium in the economy with lump-sum taxes is then given by
sequences {vt, v
f
t , ct, ht, Mt, M
f
t , Pt,w t}∞
t=0 satisfying (2), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (25), (26),
and (28), given an interest rate sequence {Rt}∞
t=0, and the exogenous sequences {y
f
t ,g t}∞
t=0.
One can show that, given the initial condition M
f
−1 and the initial price level P0, sequences
{ct,h t,v t}∞
t=0 satisfy the feasibility conditions (29) and (30), the labor supply equation
−
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
=
1
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
(37)
and
vt ≥ v and v
2
ts
0(vt) < 1,
if and only if they also satisfy the set of equilibrium conditions (2), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11),
30(25), (26), and (28). This primal form of the equilibrium conditions is essentially the same
as the one associated with the economy with distortionary taxes and government spending
except that the implementability constraint is replaced by equation (37), which states that
in equilibrium labor demand must equal labor supply. Noting that equation (37) appears in
both the standard and the primal forms of the competitive equilibrium, it follows that the
proof of the above statement is a simpliﬁed version of the one presented in appendix 12.2.
The Ramsey problem then consists in maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the
feasibility constraints (29) and (30), the labor market condition (37) and the restrictions
vt ≥ v and v2
ts0(vt) < 1, given P0 and M
f
−1.
Line 7 of table 3 presents the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium in the economy
with lump-sum taxes. All parameters of the model are calibrated as in the economy with
distortionary taxes. The table shows that the optimal rate of inﬂation equals 0.85 percent per
year. This means that the presence of a foreign demand for money gives rise to an optimal
inﬂation bias of about 5 percentage points above the level of inﬂation called for by the
Friedman rule. This inﬂation bias emerges even though the government can resort to lump-
sum taxes to ﬁnance its budget. The optimal inﬂation bias is smaller than in the case with
distortionary taxes. This is because distortionary taxes, through their depressing eﬀect on
employment and output, make the pre-foreign-seignorage level of consumption lower, raising
the marginal utility of wealth, and as a result provide bigger incentives for the extraction of
real resources from the rest of the world.
The last row of table 3 displays the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium in the case
in which government consumption equals zero at all times (gt = 0 for all t). All other things
equal, the domestic economy has access to a larger amount of resources than the economy
with positive government consumption. As a result, the government has less incentives to
collect seignorage income from the rest of the world. This is reﬂected in a smaller optimal
rate of inﬂation of 0.59 percent. It is remarkable, however, that even in the absence of
distortionary taxation and in the absence of public expenditures, the government ﬁnds it
optimal to deviate from the Friedman rule. Notice that in the absence of a foreign demand
for money, this economy is identical to the one analyzed in section 2. It follows that in the
absence of a foreign demand for money the Friedman rule would be Ramsey optimal and
the optimal inﬂation rate would be negative 3.8 percent. The ﬁnding that optimal inﬂation
is indeed positive when a foreign demand for money is added to this simple model therefore
clearly shows that ﬁscal considerations play no role in determining that the optimal rate
of inﬂation is positive. The ultimate purpose of positive interest rates in the presence of a
foreign demand for money is the extraction of real resources from the rest of the world for
private domestic consumption.
31The numerical results of this section suggest that an inﬂation target of about 2 percent
per annum may be rationalized on the basis of an incentive to tax foreign holdings of domestic
currency. This argument could in principle be raised to explain inﬂation targets observed
in countries whose currencies circulate widely outside of their borders, such as the United
States and the Euro area. However, the fact that a number of developed countries whose
currencies are not used outside of their geographic borders, such as Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand, also maintain inﬂation targets of about two percent per year, indicates that
the reason why inﬂation targets in the developed world are as high as observed may not
originate from the desire to extract seignorage revenue from foreigners.
The family of models we have analyzed up to this point have two common characteristics:
one is that a transactions demand for money represents the only source of monetary nonneu-
trality. The second characteristic is full ﬂexibility of nominal prices. We have demonstrated,
through a number of examples, that within the limits imposed by these two theoretical
features it is diﬃcult to rationalize why most central banks in the developed world have ex-
plicitly or implicitly set for themselves inﬂation targets signiﬁcantly above zero. We therefore
turn next to an alternative class of monetary models in which additional costs of inﬂation
arise from the presence of sluggish price adjustment. As we will see in this class of model
quite diﬀerent tradeoﬀs than the ones introduces thus far shape the choice of the optimal
rate of inﬂation.
6 Sticky Prices and the Optimal Rate of Inﬂation
At the heart of modern models of monetary nonneutrality is the new Keynesian Phillips
curve, which deﬁnes a dynamic tradeoﬀ between inﬂation and marginal costs that arises in
dynamic general equilibrium model economies populated by utility-maximizing households
and proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms augmented with some kind of rigidity in the adjustment of
nominal product prices. The foundations of the new Keynesian Phillips curve were laid by
Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982). Woodford (1996, 2003) and Yun (1996) completed the
development of the new Keynesian Phillips curve by introducing optimizing behavior on the
part of ﬁrms facing Calvo-type dynamic nominal rigidities.
The most important policy implication of models featuring a new Keynesian Phillips
curve is the optimality of price stability. Goodfriend and King (1997) provide an early
presentation of this result. This policy implication introduces a sharp departure from the
ﬂexible-price models discussed in previous sections, in which optimal monetary policy grav-
itates not toward price stability, but toward price deﬂation at the real rate of interest.
We start by analyzing a simple framework within which the price-stability result can be
32obtained analytically. To this end, we remove the money demand friction from the model of
section 2 and instead introduce costs of adjusting nominal product prices. In the resulting
model, sticky prices represent the sole source of nominal friction. The model incorporates
capital accumulation and uncertainty both to stress the generality of the price stability result
and because these two features will be of use later in this chapter.
6.1 A Sticky-Price Model with Capital Accumulation
Consider an economy populated by a large number of households with preferences described
by the utility function
E0
∞ X
t=0
β
tU(ct,h t), (38)
where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t.
Other variables and symbols are as deﬁned earlier. Households collect income from supplying
labor and capital services to the market and from the ownership of ﬁrms. Labor income is
given by wtht, and income from renting capital services is given by rk
t kt, where rk
t and kt
denote the rental rate of capital and the capital stock, respectively. Households have access to
complete contingent claims markets. Speciﬁcally, in every period t households can purchase
nominal state-contingent assets. The period-t price of a stochastic payment Dt+1 is given
by Etrt,t+1Dt+1, where rt,s is a nominal stochastic discount factor such that the period-t
value of a state-contingent payment Ds occurring in period s is Etrt,sDs. The household’s
period-by-period budget constraint takes the form
ct + it + Etrt,t+1
Dt+1
Pt
=
Dt
Pt
+( 1− τ
D
t )[wtht + r
k
t kt]+φt − τ
L
t (39)
Here, it denotes gross investment, φt denotes proﬁts received from the ownership of ﬁrms, τD
t
denotes the income tax rate, and τL
t denotes lump-sum taxes. The capital stock is assumed
to depreciate at the constant rate δ. The evolution of capital is given by
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it. (40)
Households are also assumed to be subject to a borrowing limit of the form lims→∞Etrt,sDs ≥
0, which prevents them from engaging in Ponzi schemes.
The household’s problem consists in maximizing the utility function (38) subject to (39),
(40), and the no-Ponzi-game borrowing limit. The ﬁrst-order conditions associated with the
33household’s problem are
−
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
=( 1− τ
D
t )wt,
Uc(ct,h t)=βEtUc(ct+1,h t+1)
￿
(1 − τ
D
t+1)r
k
t+1 +( 1− δ)
￿
Uc(ct,h t)rt,t+1 = β
Uc(ct+1,h t+1)
πt+1
. (41)
Final goods, denoted at ≡ ct +it, are assumed to be a composite of a continuum of diﬀeren-
tiated intermediate goods, ait, i ∈ [0,1], produced via the aggregator function
at =
￿Z 1
0
ait
1−1/ηdi
￿1/(1−1/η)
,
where the parameter η>1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across dif-
ferent varieties of intermediate goods. The demand for intermediate good ait is then given
by
ait =
￿
Pit
Pt
￿−η
at,
where Pt is a nominal price index deﬁned as
Pt =
￿Z 1
0
P
1−η
it di
￿ 1
1−η
. (42)
Each good’s variety i ∈ [0,1] is produced by a single ﬁrm in a monopolistically competitive
environment. Each ﬁrm i produces output using as factor inputs capital services, kit, and
labor services, hit, both of which are supplied by households in a perfectly competitive
fashion. The production technology is given by
ztF(kit,h it) − χ,
where the function F is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one, concave, and strictly
increasing in both arguments. The variable zt denotes an exogenous, aggregate productivity
shock. The parameter χ introduces ﬁxed costs of production. Firms are assumed to satisfy
demand at the posted price, that is,
ztF(kit,h it) − χ ≥
￿
Pit
Pt
￿−η
at. (43)
34Proﬁts of ﬁrm i at date t are given by:
Pit
Pt
ait − r
k
t kit − wthit.
The objective of the ﬁrm is to choose contingent plans for Pit, hit, and kit to maximize the
present discounted value of proﬁts, given by
Et
∞ X
s=t
rt,sPs
￿
Pis
Ps
ais − r
k
skis − wshis,
￿
subject to constraint (43). Then, letting rt,sPsmcis be the Lagrange multiplier associated
with constraint (43), the ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm’s maximization problem with
respect to labor and capital services are, respectively,
mcitztFh(kit,h it)=wt
and
mcitztFk(kit,h it)=r
k
t .
It is clear from these expressions that the Lagrange multiplier mcit reﬂects the marginal cost
of production of variety i in period t. Notice that because all ﬁrms face the same factor prices
and because they all have access to the same production technology with F homogeneous of
degree one, the capital-labor ratio, kit/hit and marginal cost, mcit, are identical across ﬁrms.
Therefore, we will drop the subscript i from mcit.
Prices are assumed to be sticky ` a la Calvo (1983), Woodford (1996) and Yun (1996).
Speciﬁcally, each period a fraction α ∈ [0,1) of randomly picked ﬁrms is not allowed to
change the nominal price of the good it produces, that is, each period, a fraction α of ﬁrms
must charge the same price as in the previous period. The remaining (1 − α) ﬁrms choose
prices optimally. Suppose ﬁrm i gets to pick its price in period t, and let ˜ Pit denote the
chosen price. This price is set to maximize the expected present discounted value of proﬁts.
That is, ˜ Pit maximizes
Et
∞ X
s=t
rt,sPsα
s−t





 
˜ Pit
Ps
!1−η
as − r
k
skis − wshis

 +m c s
"
zsF(kis,h is) − χ −
 
˜ Pit
Ps
!−η
as
#


.
35The ﬁrst-order condition associated with this maximization problem is
Et
∞ X
s=t
rt,sα
s−t
 
˜ Pit
Ps
!−1−η
as
"
mcs −
η − 1
η
˜ Pit
Ps
#
=0 .
According to this expression, ﬁrms whose price is free to adjust in the current period, pick a
price level such that a weighted average of current and future expected diﬀerences between
marginal costs and marginal revenue equals zero. Moreover, it is clear from this optimality
condition that the chosen price ˜ Pit is the same for all ﬁrms that can reoptimize their price
in period t. We can therefore drop the subscript i from ˜ Pit. We link the aggregate price
level Pt to the price level chosen by the (1−α) ﬁrms that reoptimize their price in period t,
˜ Pt. To this end, we write the deﬁnition of the aggregate price level given in equation (42) as
follows
P
1−η
t = αP
1−η
t−1 +( 1− α) ˜ P
1−η
t .
Letting ˜ pt ≡
˜ Pt
Pt denote the relative price of goods produced by ﬁrms that reoptimize their
price in period t and πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denote the gross rate of inﬂation in period t, the above
expression can be written as
1=απ
η−1
t +( 1− α)˜ p
1−η
t .
We derive an aggregate resource constraint for the economy by imposing market clearing at
the level of intermediate goods. Speciﬁcally, the market clearing condition in the market for
intermediate good i is given by
ztF(kit,h it) − χ = ait.
Taking into account that ait = at
￿
Pit
Pt
￿−η
, that the capital labor ratio kit/hit is independent
of i, and that the function F is homogeneous of degree of one, we can integrate the above
market clearing condition over all goods i to obtain
htztF
￿
kt
ht
,1
￿
− χ = stat,
where ht ≡
R 1
0 hitdi and kt ≡
R 1
0 kitdi denote the aggregate levels of labor and capital
services in period t and st ≡
R 1
0
￿
Pit
Pt
￿−η
di is a measure of price dispersion. To complete the
36aggregation of the model we express the variable st recursively as follows
st =
Z 1
0
￿
Pit
Pt
￿−η
di
=
Z
1−α
 
˜ Pt
Pt
!−η
di +
Z
α
￿
Pit−1
Pt
￿−η
di
=( 1 − α)˜ p
−η
t +
￿
Pt−1
Pt
￿−η Z
α
￿
Pit−1
Pt−1
￿−η
di
=( 1 − α)˜ p
−η
t + απ
η
t st−1.
The state variable st measures the resource costs induced by the ineﬃcient price dispersion
present in the Calvo-Woodford-Yun model in equilibrium. Two observations are in order
about the dispersion measure st. First, st is bounded below by 1. Second, in an economy
where the non-stochastic level of inﬂation is nil, i.e., when π = 1, there is no price dispersion
in the long-run. That is, s = 1 in the deterministic steady state. This completes the
aggregation of the model.
The ﬁscal authority can levy lump-sum taxes/subsidies, τL
t , as well as distortionary
income taxes/subsidies, τD
t . Assume that ﬁscal policy is passive in the sense that the gov-
ernment’s intertemporal budget constraint is satisﬁed independently of the value of the price
level.
A competitive equilibrium is a set of processes ct, ht, mct, kt+1, it, st, and ˜ pt that satisfy
−
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
=( 1− τ
D
t )mctztFh(kt,h t), (44)
Uc(ct,h t)=βEtUc(ct+1,h t+1)
￿
(1 − τ
D
t+1)mct+1zt+1Fk(kt+1,h t+1)+( 1− δ)
￿
, (45)
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it, (46)
1
st
[ztF(kt,h t) − χ]=ct + it, (47)
st =( 1− α)˜ p
−η
t + απ
η
t st−1, (48)
1=απ
η−1
t +( 1− α)˜ p
1−η
t , (49)
and
Et
∞ X
s=t
(αβ)
sUc(cs,h s)
Uc(ct,h t)
 
s Y
k=t+1
π
−1
k
!−η
(cs + is)
"
mcs −
￿
η − 1
η
￿ 
˜ pt
s Y
k=t+1
π
−1
k
!#
=0 , (50)
37given the policy processes τD
t and πt, the exogenous process zt, and the initial conditions k0
and s−1. We assume that s−1 =1 . 6
6.2 Optimality of Zero Inﬂation with Production Subsidies
We now show that the optimal monetary policy calls for price stability at all times. To see
this, set πt = 1 and τD
t = − 1
η−1 for all t ≥ 0. It follows from equilibrium condition (49)
that ˜ pt = 1 at all times and from (48) that st = 1 for all t ≥ 0 as well. Now consider the
conjecture mct =( η −1)/η for all t ≥ 0. Under this conjecture equilibrium condition (50) is
satisﬁed for all t. The remaining equilibrium conditions, (44)-(47), then simplify to
−
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
= ztFh(kt,h t),
Uc(ct,h t)=βEtUc(ct+1,h t+1)[zt+1Fk(kt+1,h t+1)+( 1− δ)],
ztF(kt,h t) − χ = ct + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt.
This is a system of three equations in the three unknowns, ct,h t,k t+1. Note that these
equations are identical to the optimality conditions of the social planner problem
maxE0
∞ X
t=0
β
tU(ct,h t)
subject to
ztF(kt,h t) − χ = ct + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt.
We have therefore demonstrated that the policy πt = 1 and (1 − τD
t )=η/(η − 1) induces a
competitive-equilibrium real allocation that is identical to the real allocation associated with
the social planner’s problem. Therefore the proposed policy is not only Ramsey optimal but
also Pareto optimal.
It is remarkable that eventhough this economy is stochastic, the optimal policy regime
calls for deterministic paths of the aggregate price level Pt and the income tax rate τD
t .
The reason why zero inﬂation is the optimal monetary policy in the context of this model
is that it eliminates the relative price dispersion that arises when ﬁrms change prices in a
staggered fashion. The proposed policy creates an environment in which ﬁrms never wish
(even in the presence of uncertainty) to change the nominal price of the good they sell. We
note that under the optimal policy τD
t is time invariant and negative (recall that η>1).
6This assumption eliminates transitional dynamics in the Ramsey equilibrium. For a study of optimal
policy in the case that this assumption is not satisﬁed see Yun (2005).
38The negativity of τD
t implies that the Ramsey government subsidizes the use of capital and
labor services to raise output above the level associated with the imperfectly competitive
equilibrium and up to the level that would arise in a perfectly competitive equilibrium in
which each intermediate goods producing ﬁrm is compensated in a lump-sum fashion for its
sunk cost χ.
The assumption that the government can subsidize factor inputs and ﬁnance such sub-
sidies with lump-sum taxation is perhaps not the most compelling one. And it is therefore
of interest to ask whether the optimality of zero inﬂation at all times continues to be true
when it is assumed that the government does not have access to a subsidy. We consider this
case in the next subsection.
6.3 Optimality of Zero Inﬂation without Production Subsidies
In this subsection, we investigate whether the optimality of zero inﬂation is robust to as-
suming that the government lacks access to the subsidy τD
t . We show analytically that in
the Ramsey steady state the inﬂation rate is zero. That is, the Ramsey planner does not
use inﬂation to correct distortions stemming from monopolistic competition. Although the
proof of this result is somewhat tedious, we provide it here because to our knowledge it does
not exist elsewhere in the literature.7
We begin by writing the ﬁrst-order condition (50) recursively. To this end we introduce
two auxiliary variables, x1
t and x2
t, which denote an output weighted present discounted value
of marginal revenues and marginal costs, respectively. Formally, we write equation (50) as
x
1
t = x
2
t (51)
where
x
1
t ≡ Et
∞ X
s=t
(αβ)
s−tUc(cs,h s)
Uc(ct,h t)
˜ p
1−η
t
￿
Pt
Ps
￿1−η
(cs + is)
￿
η − 1
η
￿
and
x
2
t ≡ Et
∞ X
s=t
(αβ)
s−tUc(cs,h s)
Uc(ct,h t)
˜ p
−η
t
￿
Pt
Ps
￿−η
(cs + is)mcs.
7Benigno and Woodford (2005) prove the optimality of zero steady state inﬂation in the context a of
Calvo-Yun-type sticky-price model without capital, with particular functional forms for the production and
the utility functions, and with ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor. King and Wolman (1999) show the optimality of zero
steady-state inﬂation in the context of a sticky-price model with two-period Taylor-type price staggering, no
capital, linear technology, and a speciﬁc period utility function.
39The variables x1
t and x2
t can be written recursively as
x
1
t =˜ p
1−η
t (ct + it)
￿
η − 1
η
￿
+ αβEt
￿
˜ pt
˜ pt+1
￿1−η
π
η−1
t+1
Uc(ct+1,h t+1)
Uc(ct,h t)
x
1
t+1 (52)
and
x
2
t =˜ p
−η
t (ct + it)mct + αβEt
Uc(ct+1,h t+1)
Uc(ct,h t)
￿
˜ pt
˜ pt+1
￿−η
π
η
t+1x
2
t+1. (53)
The Ramsey planner then chooses ct, ht, mct, kt+1, it, st, πt, x1
t, x2
t, and ˜ pt to maximize
(1) subject to (40), (44), (45), (47), (48), (49), (51), (52), and (53) with τD
t = 0 at all times
and given the exogenous process zt and the initial conditions k0 and s−1.
We are particularly interested in deriving the ﬁrst-order conditions of the Ramsey problem
with respect to πt,˜ pt, and x1
t. Letting λ1
t denote the Lagrange multiplier on (52), λ2
t the
multiplier on (53), λ3
t the multiplier on (49), and λ4
t the multiplier on (48), the part of the
Lagrangian of the Ramsey problem that is relevant for our purpose (that is, the part that
contains πt,˜ pt, and x1
t) is the following
L =
∞ X
t=0
β
t
(
···+ λ
1
t
"
˜ p
1−η
t (ct + it)
￿
η − 1
η
￿
+ αβEt
￿
˜ pt
˜ pt+1
￿1−η
π
η−1
t+1
Uc(ct+1,h t+1)
Uc(ct,h t)
x
1
t+1 − x
1
t
#
+λ
2
t
"
˜ p
−η
t (ct + it)mct + αβEt
Uc(ct+1,h t+1)
Uc(ct,h t)
￿
˜ pt
˜ pt+1
￿−η
π
η
t+1x
1
t+1 − x
1
t
#
+λ
3
t
￿
απ
η−1
t +( 1− α)˜ p
1−η
t − 1
￿
+λ
4
t
￿
(1 − α)˜ p
−η
t + απ
η
t st−1 − st
￿
+...}
where we have replaced x2
t with x1
t. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to πt,˜ pt, and x1
t,
in that order, are:
λ
1
t−1
"
α
￿
˜ pt−1
˜ pt
￿1−η
π
η−2
t (η − 1)
Uc(ct,h t)
Uc(ct−1,h t−1)
x
1
t
#
+ λ
2
t−1
"
ηα
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Uc(ct−1,h t−1)
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￿−η
π
η−1
t x
1
t
#
+λ
3
t
￿
(η − 1)απ
η−2
t
￿
+ λ
4
t
￿
ηαπ
η−1
t st−1
￿
=0
40λ
1
t(1 − η)˜ p
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η
￿
+λ
1
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=0
We restrict attention to the Ramsey steady state and thus can drop all time subscripts.
We want to check whether a Ramsey steady state with π = 1 exists. Given a value for π,w e
can ﬁnd ˜ p, k, c, h, i, x1, s, and mc from the competitive equilibrium conditions (40), (44),
(45), (47), (48), (49), (51), (52), and (53) and imposing τD
t = 0. Speciﬁcally, when π =1b y
equation (49) we have that ˜ p = 1, by equation (48) that s = 1, and by equations (51), (52),
and (53) that (η−1)/η = mc. We can then write the steady-state version of the above three
ﬁrst-order conditions as
λ
1 ￿
α(η − 1)x
1￿
+ λ
2 ￿
ηαx
1￿
+ λ
3(η − 1)α + λ
4ηα = 0 (54)
λ
1(1 − η)(1 − α)x
1 − ηλ
2(1 − α)x
1 + λ
3(1 − α)(1 − η)+λ
4(1 − α)(−η) = 0 (55)
and
λ
1 + λ
2 =0 .
Replacing λ2 by −λ1 and collecting terms, equations (54) and (55) become the same expres-
41sion, namely,
−λ
1x
1 + λ
3(η − 1) + λ
4η =0 .
At this point, under the proposed solution π = 1, we have in hand steady state values for π,
˜ p, s, mc, x1, k, i, c, h, and two restrictions on Lagrange multipliers, namely, λ2 = −λ1 and
λ1 =( ηλ4 +( η − 1)λ3)/x1. This leaves six Lagrange multipliers, which are λ3 through λ8,
to be determined. We have not used yet the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to st, mct,
kt+1, it, ct, and ht, which are six linear equations in the remaining six Lagrange multipliers.
We therefore have shown that π = 1 is a solution to the ﬁrst-order conditions of the Ramsey
problem in steady state. The key step in this proof was to show that when π = 1, ﬁrst-order
conditions (54) and (55) are not independent equations.
The optimality of zero inﬂation in the absence of production subsidies extends to the case
with uncertainty. In Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007a), we show numerically in the context
of a production economy with capital accumulation like the one presented here, that even
outside of the steady state the inﬂation rate is for all practical purposes equal to zero at all
times. Speciﬁcally, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007a) ﬁnd that for plausible calibrations the
Ramsey optimal standard deviation of inﬂation is only 3 basis points at an annual rate.
6.4 Indexation
Thus far, we have assumed that ﬁrms that cannot reoptimize their prices in any given
period simply maintain the price charged in the previous period. We now analyze whether
the optimal rate of inﬂation would be aﬀected if one assumed instead that ﬁrms follow some
indexation scheme in their pricing behavior. A commonly studied indexation scheme is one
whereby nonreoptimized prices increase mechanically at a rate proportional to the economy-
wide lagged rate of inﬂation. Formally, under this indexation mechanism, any ﬁrm i that
cannot reoptimize its price in period t sets Pit = Pit−1πι
t−1, where ι ∈ [0,1], is a parameter
measuring the degree of indexation. When ι equals zero, the economy exhibits no indexation,
which is the case we have studied thus far. When ι equals unity, prices are fully indexed to
past inﬂation. And in the intermediate case in which ι lies strictly between zero and one,
the economy is characterized by partial price indexation.
Consider the sticky-price economy with a production subsidy studied in section 6.1 aug-
mented with an indexation scheme like the one described in the previous paragraph. The
set of equilibrium conditions associated with the indexed economy is identical to that of the
economy of section 6.1, with the exception that equations (48)-(50) are replaced by
st =( 1− α)˜ p
−η
t + α
￿
πt
πι
t−1
￿η
st−1, (56)
421=α
￿
πt
πι
t−1
￿η−1
+( 1− α)˜ p
1−η
t , (57)
and
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sUc(cs,h s)
Uc(ct,h t)
(cs + is)
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!η "
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˜ pt
s Y
k=t+1
πι
k−1
πk
!#
=0 . (58)
We continue to assume that s−1 = 1. Note that when ι = 0, these three expressions collapse
to equations (48)-(50). This means that the model with indexation nests the model without
indexation as a special case. For any ι ∈ [0,1], the Ramsey optimal policy is to set πt = πι
t−1
for all t ≥ 0. To see this, note that under this policy the solution to the above three
equilibrium conditions is given by ˜ pt =1 ,st = 1 and mct =( η − 1)/η for all t ≥ 0. Then,
recalling that we are assuming the existence of a production subsidy τD
t equal to −1/(η −1)
at all times and by the same logic applied in section 6.2, the remaining equilibrium conditions
of the model, given by (44)-(47), collapse to the optimality conditions of an economy with
perfect competition and ﬂexible prices. It follows that the proposed policy is both Ramsey
optimal and Pareto eﬃcient. The intuition behind this result is simple. By inducing ﬁrms
that can reoptimize prices to voluntarily mimic the price adjustment of ﬁrms that cannot
reoptimize, the policymaker ensures the absence of price dispersion across ﬁrms.
In the case of partial indexation, i.e., when ι<1, the Ramsey optimal rate of inﬂation
converges to zero. That is, under partial indexation, just as in the case of no indexation
studied in previous sections, the Ramsey steady state features zero inﬂation. When the
inherited inﬂation rate is diﬀerent from zero (π−1 6= 1), the convergence of inﬂation to
zero is gradual under the optimal policy. The speed of convergence to price stability is
governed by the parameter ι. This feature of optimal policy has an important implication
for the design of inﬂation stabilization strategies in countries in which the regulatory system
imposes an exogenous indexation mechanism on prices (such as Chile in the 1970s and Brazil
in the 1980s). For the results derived here suggest that in exogenously indexed economies
it would be suboptimal to follow a cold turkey approach to inﬂation stabilization. Instead,
in this type of economies, policymakers are better advised to follow a gradualist approach
to inﬂation stabilization, or, alternatively, to dismantle the built-in indexation mechanism
before engaging in radical inﬂation reduction eﬀorts. A diﬀerent situation arises when the
indexation mechanism is endogenous, as opposed to imposed by regulation. Endogenous
indexation naturally arises in economies undergoing high or hyperinﬂation. In this case, a
cold turkey approach to disinﬂation is viable because agents will relinquish their indexation
schemes as inﬂationary expectations drop.
Consider now the polar case of full indexation, or ι = 1. In this case the monetary
43policy that is both Ramsey optimal and Pareto eﬃcient is to set πt equal to π−1 at all times.
That is, under full indexation, the optimal monetary policy in the short and the long runs
is determined by the country’s inﬂationary history. Empirical studies of the degree of price
indexation for the United States do not support the assumption of full indexation however.
For example, the econometric estimates of the degree of price indexation reported by Cogley
and Sbordone (2008) and Levin et al. (2006), in the context of models exhibiting Calvo-
Yun price staggering, concentrate around zero. We therefore conclude that for plausible
parameterizations of the Calvo-Yun sticky-price model, the Ramsey optimal inﬂation rate
in the steady state is zero.
7 The Friedman Rule versus Price-Stability Tradeoﬀ
We have established thus far that in an economy in which the only nominal friction is a
demand for ﬁat money, deﬂation at the real rate of interest (the Friedman rule) is optimal.
We have also shown that when the only nominal friction is the presence of nominal-price-
adjustment costs, zero inﬂation emerges as the Ramsey optimal monetary policy. A realistic
economic model, however, should incorporate both a money demand and price stickiness. In
such environment, the Ramsey planner faces a tension between minimizing the opportunity
cost of holding money and minimizing the cost of price adjustments. One would naturally
expect, therefore, that when both the money demand and the sticky-price frictions are
present, the optimal rate of inﬂation falls between zero and the one called for by the Friedman
rule. The question of interest, however, is where exactly in this interval the optimal inﬂation
rate lies. No analytical results are available on the resolution of this tradeoﬀ. We therefore
carry out a numerical analysis of this issue. The resolution of the Friedman-rule-versus-price-
stability tradeoﬀ has been studied in Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) and in Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2004a, 2007b).
To analyze the Friedman-rule-versus-price-stability tradeoﬀ, we augment the sticky-price
model of section 6 with a demand for money like the one introduced in section 2. That is,
in the model of the previous section we now assume that consumers face a transaction cost
s(vt) per unit of consumption, where vt ≡ ctPt/Mt denotes the consumption-based velocity
of money. A competitive equilibrium in the economy with sticky prices and a demand for
money is a set of processes ct, vt, ht, mct, kt+1, it, st,˜ pt, and πt that satisfy
−
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
=
(1 − τD
t )mctztFh(kt,h t)
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
,
44Uc(ct,h t)
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
= βEt
Uc(ct+1,h t+1)
1+s(vt+1)+vt+1s0(vt+1)
￿
(1 − τ
D
t+1)mct+1zt+1Fk(kt+1,h t+1)+1− δ(1 − τ
D
t+1)
￿
,
(59)
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it, (60)
1
st
[ztF(kt,h t) − χ]=ct[1 + s(vt)] + it, (61)
st =( 1− α)˜ p
−η
t + απ
η
t st−1, (62)
1=απ
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t +( 1− α)˜ p
1−η
t , (63)
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(64)
v
2
ts
0(vt)=
Rt − 1
Rt
,
and
Uc(ct,h t)
1+s(vt)+vts0(vt)
= βRtEt
Uc(ct+1,h t+1)
1+s(vt+1)+vt+1s0(vt+1)
1
πt+1
,
given the policy processes τD
t and Rt, the exogenous process zt, and the initial conditions k0
and s−1.
We begin by considering the case in which the government has access to lump-sum taxes.
Therefore, we set τD
t equal to zero for all t. We assume that the utility function is of the form
given in equation (18) and that the production technology is of the from F(k,h)=kωh1−ω,
with ω ∈ (0,1). The transaction cost technology takes the form given in equation (20). We
assume that the time unit is a quarter and calibrate the structural parameters of the model
as follows: A =0 .22, B =0 .13, θ =1 .1, ω =0 .36, δ =0 .025, β =0 .9926, η =6 ,χ =0 .287,
and α =0 .8. We set the parameter χ so that proﬁts are zero. The calibrated values of
A and B imply that at a nominal interest rate of 5.5 percent per year, which is the mean
3-month Treasury Bill rate observed in the United States between 1966:Q1 and 2006:Q4,
the implied money-to-consumption ratio is 31 percent per year, which is in line with the
average M1-to-consumption ratio observed in the United States over the same period. The
calibrated value of α of 0.8 implies that prices have an average duration of 5 quarters. We
focus on the steady state of the Ramsey optimal competitive equilibrium.
Note that the Ramsey steady state is in general diﬀerent from the allocation/policy
that maximizes welfare in the steady state of a competitive equilibrium. We apply the
numerical algorithm developed in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2006) which calculates the
exact value of the Ramsey steady state. We ﬁnd that the optimal rate of inﬂation is -0.57
per cent per year. As one would expect, the Ramsey optimal inﬂation rate falls between
45the one called for by the Friedman rule, which under our calibration is -2.91 percent per
year, and the one that is optimal when the only nominal friction is price stickiness, which
is an inﬂation rate of zero percent. Our calculations show, however, that the optimal rate
of inﬂation falls much closer to the inﬂation rate that is optimal in a cashless economy with
sticky prices than to the inﬂation rate that is optimal in a monetary economy with ﬂexible
prices. This ﬁnding suggests that the Friedman rule versus sticky-price tradeoﬀ is resolved
in favor of price stability. We now study the sensitivity of this ﬁnding to changes in three
key structural parameters of the model. One parameter is α, which determines the degree
of price stickiness. The second parameter is B, which pertains to the transactions cost
technology and determines the interest elasticity of money demand. The third parameter is
A, which also belongs to the transaction cost function and governs the share of money in
output
7.1 Sensitivity of the Optimal Rate of Inﬂation to the Degree of
Price Stickiness
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007b) ﬁnd that a striking characteristic of the optimal monetary
regime is the high sensitivity of the welfare-maximizing rate of inﬂation with respect to the
parameter α, governing the degree of price stickiness, for the range of values of this parameter
that is empirically relevant.
The parameter α measures the probability that a ﬁrm is not able to optimally set the
price it charges in a particular quarter. The average number of periods elapsed between two
consecutive optimal price adjustments is given by 1/(1 − α). Available empirical estimates
of the degree of price rigidity using macroeconomic data vary from 2 to 6.5 quarters, or
α ∈ [0.5,0.85]. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) estimate α to be
0.6. By contrast, Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Lind´ e (2005) estimate a marginal-cost-
gap coeﬃcient in the Phillips curve that is consistent with a value of α of around 0.8. Both
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Lind´ e use an
impulse-response matching technique to estimate the price-stickiness parameter α. Bayesian
estimates of this parameter include Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004),
Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005), and Smets and Wouters (2007) who report
posterior means of 0.67, 0.83, and 0.66, respectively, and 90-percent posterior probability
intervals of (0.51,0.83), (0.81,0.86), and (0.56,0.74), respectively.
Recent empirical studies have documented the frequency of price changes using micro
data underlying the construction of the U.S. consumer price index. These studies diﬀer in
the sample period considered, in the disaggregation of the price data, and in the treatment
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of sales and stockouts. The median frequency of price changes reported by Bils and Klenow
(2004) is 4 to 5 months, the one reported by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) is 4 to 7 months,
and the one reported by Nakamura and Steinsson (2007) is 8 to 11 months. However, there
is no immediate translation of these frequency estimates to the parameter α governing the
degree of price stickiness in Calvo-style models of price staggering. Consider, for instance,
the case of indexation. In the presence of indexation, even though ﬁrms change prices every
period—implying the highest possible frequency of price changes—prices themselves may be
highly sticky for they may only be reoptimized at much lower frequencies.
Figure 1 displays with a solid line the relationship between the degree of price stickiness,
α, and the optimal rate of inﬂation in percent per year, π, implied by the model under study.
When α equals 0.5, the lower range of the available empirical evidence using macro data, the
optimal rate of inﬂation is -2.9 percent, which is the level called for by the Friedman rule.
For a value of α of 0.85, which is near the upper range of the available empirical evidence
using macro data, the optimal level of inﬂation rises to -0.3 percent, which is close to price
stability.
This ﬁnding suggest that given the uncertainty surrounding the empirical estimates of
the degree of price stickiness, the neo Keynesian model studied here does not deliver a clear
47recommendation regarding the level of inﬂation that a benevolent central bank should target.
This diﬃculty is related to the shape of the relationship linking the degree of price stickiness
to the optimal level of inﬂation. The problem resides in the fact that, as is evident from
ﬁgure 1, this relationship becomes signiﬁcantly steep precisely for the range of values of α
that is empirically most compelling.
It turns out that an important factor determining the shape of the function relating the
optimal level of inﬂation to the degree of price stickiness is the underlying ﬁscal policy regime.
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007b) show that ﬁscal considerations fundamentally change the
long-run tradeoﬀ between price stability and the Friedman rule. To see this, we now consider
an economy where lump-sum taxes are unavailable. Instead, the ﬁscal authority must ﬁnance
its budget by means of proportional income taxes. Formally, in this speciﬁcation of the model
the Ramsey planner sets optimally not only the monetary policy instrument, Rt, but also
the ﬁscal policy instrument, τD
t . Figure 1 displays with a dash-circled line the relationship
between the degree of price stickiness, α, and the optimal rate of inﬂation, π, in the economy
with optimally chosen ﬁscal and monetary policy. In stark contrast to what happens under
lump-sum taxation, under optimal distortionary income taxation the function linking π and
α is ﬂat and close to zero for the entire range of macro-data-based empirically plausible
values of α, namely 0.5 to 0.85. In other words, when taxes are distortionary and optimally
determined, price stability emerges as a prediction that is robust to the existing uncertainty
about the exact degree of price stickiness.
Our intuition for why price stability arises as a robust policy recommendation in the
economy with optimally set distortionary taxation runs as follows. Consider the economy
with lump-sum taxation. Deviating from the Friedman rule (by raising the inﬂation rate)
has the beneﬁt of reducing price adjustment costs. Consider next the economy with op-
timally chosen income taxation and no lump-sum taxes. In this economy, deviating from
the Friedman rule still provides the beneﬁt of reducing price adjustment costs. However, in
this economy increasing inﬂation has the additional beneﬁt of increasing seignorage revenue
thereby allowing the social planner to lower distortionary income tax rates. Therefore, the
Friedman-rule versus price-stability tradeoﬀ is tilted in favor of price stability.
It follows from this intuition that what is essential in inducing the optimality of price
stability is that on the margin the ﬁscal authority trades oﬀ the inﬂation tax for regular
taxation. Indeed, it can be shown that if distortionary tax rates are ﬁxed, even if they are
ﬁxed at the level that is optimal in a world without lump-sum taxes, and the ﬁscal authority
has access to lump-sum taxes on the margin, the optimal rate of inﬂation is much closer to
the Friedman rule than to zero. In this case, increasing inﬂation no longer has the beneﬁt of
reducing distortionary taxes. As a result, the Ramsey planner has less incentives to inﬂate
48(see Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2007b).
It is remarkable that in a ﬂexible-price, monetary economy the optimal rate of inﬂation is
insensitive to whether the government has access to distortionary taxation or not. In eﬀect,
we have seen that in a ﬂexible-price environment with a demand for money it is always
optimal to set the inﬂation rate at the level called for by the Friedman rule. Indeed, this
characteristic of optimal policy in the ﬂexible price model led an entire literature in the 1990s
to dismiss Phelps’ (1973) conjecture that the presence of distortionary taxes should induce
a departure from the Friedman rule. Phelps’ conjecture, however, regains validity when
evaluated in the context of models with price rigidities. As is evident from our discussion of
ﬁgure 1 in a monetary economy with price stickiness, the optimal rate of inﬂation is highly
sensitive to the type of ﬁscal instrument available to the government.
7.2 Sensitivity of the Optimal Rate of Inﬂation to the Size and
Elasticity of Money Demand
Figure 2 displays the steady-state Ramsey optimal rate of inﬂation as a function of the
share of money in output in the model with lump-sum taxes. The range of money-to-output
ratios on the horizontal axis of the ﬁgure is generated by varying the parameter A in the
transactions cost function from 0 to 0.3. The special case of a cashless economy corresponds
to the point in the ﬁgure in which the share of money in output equals zero (that is, A = 0).
The ﬁgure shows that at this point the Ramsey optimal rate of inﬂation is equal to zero. This
result demonstrates that even in the absence of production subsidies aimed at eliminating
the ineﬃciency associated with imperfect competition in product markets (recall that we are
assuming that τD
t = 0), the optimal rate of inﬂation is zero when the only source of nominal
frictions is the presence of sluggish price adjustment. The result illustrates numerically the
one obtained analytically in section 6.3.
The ﬁgure shows that as the value of the parameter A increases, the money-to-output
share rises and the Ramsey optimal rate of inﬂation falls. This is because when the demand
for money is nonzero, the social planner must compromise between price stability (which
minimizes the costs of nominal price dispersion across intermediate-good producing ﬁrms)
and deﬂation at the real rate of interest (which minimizes the opportunity cost of holding
money). The ﬁgure shows that even at money-to-output ratios as high as 25 percent, the
optimal rate of inﬂation is far above the one called for by the Friedman rule (-0.65 percent
versus -2.9 percent, respectively).
Under our baseline calibration the implied money demand elasticity is low. At a nominal
interest rate of 0, the money-to-consumption ratio is only 2 percentage points higher than
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obtained by varying the parameter A of the transaction cost function from 0 to
0.3 and keeping all other parameters of the model constant.
50at a nominal interest rate of 5.5 percent. For this reason, we also consider a calibration in
which the parameter B of the transaction cost function is ﬁve times smaller and adjust the
parameter A so that money demand continues to be 31 percent of consumption at an annual
interest rate of 5.5 percent. Under this alternative calibration, money demand increases from
31 to 40 percent as the interest rate falls from the average U.S. value of 5.5 percent to 0
percent. The relationship between the share of money in output and the optimal rate of
inﬂation in the economy with the high interest elasticity of money demand is shown with a
circled line in ﬁgure 2. The ﬁgure shows that even when the interest elasticity is ﬁve times
higher than in the baseline case, the optimal rate of inﬂation remains near zero. Speciﬁcally,
the largest decline in the optimal rate of inﬂation occurs at the high end of money-to-output
ratios considered and is only 15 basis points. We conclude that for plausible calibrations the
price-stickiness friction dominates the optimal choice of long-run inﬂation.
We wish to close this section by drawing attention to the fact that, quite independently
of the precise degree of price stickiness or the size and elasticity of money demand, the
optimal inﬂation target is at most zero. In light of this robust result, it remains hard to
rationalize why countries that self-classify as inﬂation targeters set inﬂation targets that are
positive. An argument often raised in defense of positive inﬂation targets is that negative
inﬂation targets imply nominal interest rates that are dangerously close to the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates and hence may impair the central bank’s ability to conduct
stabilization policy. We will evaluate the merits of this argument in the following section.
8 Does the Zero Bound Provide a Rationale for Posi-
tive Inﬂation Targets?
One popular argument against setting a zero or negative inﬂation target is that at zero or
negative rates of inﬂation the risk of hitting the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
would severely restrict the central bank’s ability to conduct successful stabilization policy.
This argument is made explicit, for example, in Summers (1991). The evaluation of this
argument hinges critically on assessing how frequently the zero bound would be hit under
optimal policy. It is therefore a question that depends primarily on the size of exogenous
shocks the economy is subject to and on the real and nominal frictions that govern the
transmission of such shocks. We believe therefore that this argument is best evaluated in the
context of an empirically realistic quantitative model of the business cycle. In Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2007b) we study Ramsey optimal monetary policy in an estimated medium-scale
model of the macroeconomy. The theoretical framework employed there emphasizes the
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macroeconomic shocks. Speciﬁcally, the model features four nominal frictions, sticky prices,
sticky wages, a transactional demand for money by households, and a cash-in-advance con-
straint on the wage bill of ﬁrms, and four sources of real rigidities, investment adjustment
costs, variable capacity utilization, habit formation, and imperfect competition in product
and factor markets. Aggregate ﬂuctuations are driven by three shocks: a permanent neutral
labor-augmenting technology shock, a permanent investment-speciﬁc technology shock, and
temporary variations in government spending. Altig et al. (2005) and Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005), using a limited information econometric approach, argue that the
model economy for which we seek to design optimal monetary policy can indeed explain the
observed responses of inﬂation, real wages, nominal interest rates, money growth, output,
investment, consumption, labor productivity, and real proﬁts to neutral and investment-
speciﬁc productivity shocks and monetary shocks in the postwar United States. Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007) also conclude, on the basis of a full information Bayesian econometric
estimation, that the medium-scale neo Keynesian framework provides an adequate frame-
work for understanding business cycles in the postwar United States and Europe.
In the simulations reported in this section, we calibrate the three structural shocks as
follows. We construct a time series of the relative price of investment in the United States for
the period 1955Q1 to 2006Q4. We then use this time series to estimate an AR(1) process for
the growth rate of the relative price of investment. The estimated serial correlation is 0.45
and the estimated standard deviation of the innovation of the process is 0.0037. These two
ﬁgures imply that the growth rate of the price of investment has an unconditional standard
deviation of 0.0042. Ravn (2005) estimates an AR(1) process for the detrended level of
government purchases in the context of a model similar to the one we are studying and ﬁnds
a serial correlation of 0.9 and a standard deviation of the innovation to the AR(1) process
of 0.008. Finally, we assume that the permanent neutral labor-augmenting technology shock
follows a random walk with a drift. We set the standard deviation of the innovation to
this process at 0.0188, to match the observed volatility of per capita output growth of 0.91
percent per quarter in the United States over the period 1955Q1 to 2006Q4. For the purpose
of calibrating this standard deviation, we assume that monetary policy takes the form of
a Taylor-type interest rate feedback rule with an inﬂation coeﬃcient of 1.5 and an output
coeﬃcient of 0.125. We note that in the context of our model an output coeﬃcient of
0.125 in the interest rate feedback rule corresponds to the 0.5 output coeﬃcient estimated
by Taylor (1993). This is because Taylor estimates the interest rate feedback rule using
annualized rates of interest and inﬂation whereas in our model these two rates are expressed
in quarterly terms. All other parameters of the model are calibrated as in Schmitt-Groh´ e
52and Uribe (2007b). In particular, the subjective discount rate is set at 3 percent per year
and the average growth rate of per-capita output at 1.8 percent per year. This means that in
the deterministic steady state the real rate of interest equals 4.8 percent, a value commonly
used in business-cycle studies. After completing the calibration of the model, we drop the
assumption that the monetary authority follows an interest rate feedback rule and proceed to
characterize Ramsey optimal monetary policy ignoring the occasionally binding constraint
implied by the zero bound.
The Ramsey optimal policy implies a mean inﬂation rate of -0.4 percent per year. This
slightly negative inﬂation target is in line with the quantitative results we obtain in section 7
using a much simpler model of the monetary transmission mechanism. More importantly
for our purposes however are the predictions of the model for the Ramsey optimal level and
volatility of the nominal rate of interest. Under the Ramsey optimal monetary policy, the
standard deviation of the nominal interest rate is only 0.9 percentage points at an annual
rate. At the same time, the mean of the Ramsey optimal level of the nominal interest rate
is 4.4 percent. These two ﬁgures taken together imply that for the nominal interest rate to
violate the zero bound, it must fall more than 4 standard deviations below its target level.
This ﬁnding suggests that in the context of the model analyzed here, the probability that the
Ramsey optimal nominal interest rate violates the zero bound is practically nil. This result
is robust to lowering the deterministic real rate of interest. Lowering the subjective discount
factor from its baseline value of 3 to 1 percent per year, results in a Ramsey-optimal nominal
interest rate process that has a mean of 2.4 percent per year and a standard deviation of 0.9
percent per year. This means that under this calibration the nominal interest rate must still
fall by almost three standard deviations below its mean for the zero bound to be violated.
Some have argue, however, that a realistic value of the subjective discount factor is likely to
be higher and not lower than the value of 3 percent used in our baseline calibration. This
argument arises typically from studies that set the discount factor to match the average
risk-free interest rate in a nonlinear stochastic environment rather than simply to match
the deterministic steady-state real interest rate (see, for instance, Campbell and Cochrane,
1999).
It is worth stressing that our analysis abstracted from the occasionally binding constraint
imposed by the zero bound. However, the fact that in the Ramsey equilibrium the zero bound
is violated so rarely leads us to conjecture that in an augmented version of the model that
explicitly imposes the zero bound constraint, the optimal inﬂation target would be similar
to the value of -0.4 percent per year that is optimal in the current model. This conjecture
is supported by the work of Adam and Billi (2006). These authors compute the optimal
monetary policy in a simpler version of the new Keynesian model considered in this section.
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restriction in computing the optimal policy regime. They ﬁnd that the optimal monetary
policy does not imply positive inﬂation on average and that the zero bound binds infrequently.
Their ﬁnding of a nonpositive average optimal rate of inﬂation is furthermore of interest in
light of the fact that their model does not incorporate a demand for money. We conjecture,
based on the results reported in this section, that should a money demand be added to their
framework, the average optimal rate of inﬂation would indeed be negative.
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) also consider the question of the optimal rate of in-
ﬂation in the presence of the zero-lower-bound restriction on nominal rates. Their analysis
is conducted within the context of the large-scale FRB/US model. In their exercise, the
objective function of the central bank is to minimize a weighted sum of inﬂation and output
square deviations from targets. They ﬁnd that under optimized simple interest-rate feedback
rules (which take the form of Taylor rules modiﬁed to past policy constraints or of Taylor
rules that respond to the cumulative deviation of inﬂation from target) the zero bound has
on average negligible eﬀects on the central bank’s ability to stabilize the economy. Further,
these authors ﬁnd that under optimized rules episodes in which the zero bound is binding
are rare even at a low target rate of inﬂation of zero.
9 Downward Nominal Rigidity
One rational for pursuing a positive inﬂation target that surfaces often in the academic and
policy debate is the existence of asymmetries in nominal factor- or product-price rigidity. For
instance, there is ample evidence suggesting that nominal wages are more rigid downward
than upward (see, for instance, McLaughlin, 1994; Akerlof et al., 1996; and Card and Hyslop,
1997).
The idea that downward nominal price rigidity can make positive inﬂation desirable goes
back at least to Olivera (1964), who refers to this phenomenon as structural inﬂation. The
starting point of Olivera’s analysis is a situation in which equilibrium relative prices are
changed by an exogenous shock. In this context, and assuming that the monetary authority
passively accommodates the required relative price change, Olivera explains the inﬂationary
mechanism invoked by downward rigidity in nominal prices as follows:8
[A] clear-cut case is that in which money prices are only responsive to either pos-
itive or negative excess demand (unidirectional ﬂexibility). Then every relative
8The model described in this passage is, as Olivera (1964) points out, essentially the same presented in
his presidential address to the Argentine Association of Political Economy on October 8, 1959 and later
published in Olivera (1960).
54price adjustment gives rise to a variation of the price level, upward if there exists
downward inﬂexibility of money prices, downward if there is upward inﬂexibil-
ity. Thus, in a medium of downward inﬂexible money prices any adjustment of
price-ratios reverberates as an increase of the money price-level. (p. 323.)
As for the desirability of inﬂation in the presence of nominal downward rigidities, Olivera
(1964) writes
As to the money supply, [...] the full-employment goal can be construed as
requiring a pari passu adaptation of the ﬁnancial base to the rise of the price-
level [...]. (p. 326)
Clearly, Olivera’s notion of ‘structural inﬂation’ is tantamount to the metaphor of ‘inﬂation
greasing the wheels of markets,’ employed in more recent expositions of the real eﬀects of
nominal downward rigidities. Tobin (1972) similarly argues that a positive rate of inﬂation
may be necessary to avoid unemployment when nominal wages are downwardly rigid.
Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) quantify the eﬀect of downward nominal wage rigidity
on the optimal rate of inﬂation. They embed downward nominal rigidity into a dynamic
stochastic neo-Keynesian model with price stickiness and no capital accumulation. They
model price and wage stickiness ` a la Rotemberg (1982). The novel element of their analysis
is that wage adjustment costs are asymmetric. Speciﬁcally, the suppliers of diﬀerentiated
labor inputs are assumed to be subject to wage adjustment costs, Φ(W
j
t /W
j
t−1), that take
the form of a linex function in wage inﬂation:
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where W
j
t denotes the nominal wage charged by supplier j in period t and φ and ψ are
positive parameters. The wage-adjustment-cost function Φ(·) is positive, strictly convex, and
has a minimum of 0 at zero wage inﬂation (W
j
t = W
j
t−1). More importantly, this function
is asymmetric around zero wage inﬂation. Its slope is larger in absolute value for negative
wage inﬂation rates than for positive ones. In this way, it captures the notion that nominal
wages are more rigid downward than upward. As the parameter ψ approaches inﬁnity, the
function becomes L-shaped, corresponding to the limit case of full downward inﬂexibility
and full upward ﬂexibility. When ψ approaches zero, the adjustment cost function becomes
quadratic, corresponding to the standard case of symmetric wage adjustment costs. Kim
and Ruge-Murcia estimate the structural parameters of the model using a simulated method
of moments technique and a second-order-accurate approximation of the model. They ﬁnd
a point estimate of the asymmetry parameter ψ of 3,844.4 with a standard error of 1,186.7.
55The key result reported by Kim and Ruge-Murcia is that under the Ramsey optimal
monetary policy the unconditional mean of the inﬂation rate is 0.35 percent per year. This
ﬁgure is too small to explain the inﬂation targets of two percent observed in the industrial
world. Moreover, this ﬁgure is likely to be an upper bound for the size of the inﬂation bias
introduced by downward nominal rigidities in wages for the following two reasons. First,
their model abstracts from a money-demand friction. One would expect that should such
a friction be included in the model, the optimal rate of inﬂation would be smaller than the
reported 35 basis points, as the policymaker would ﬁnd it costly from the Friedman rule.
Second, Kim and Ruge-Murcia’s analysis abstracts from long-run growth in real wages. As
these authors acknowledge, in a model driven only by aggregate disturbances, the larger is
the average growth rate of the economy, the less likely it is that real wages experience a
decline over the business cycle and hence that inﬂation is needed to facilitate the eﬃcient
adjustment of the real price of labor.
10 Quality Bias and the Optimal Rate of Inﬂation
In June 1995, the Senate Finance Committee appointed an advisory commission composed of
ﬁve prominent economists (Michael Boskin, Ellen Dulberger, Robert Gordon, Zvi Griliches,
and Dale Jorgenson) to study the magnitude of the measurement error in the consumer
price index. The commission concluded that over the period 1995-1996, the U.S. CPI had
an upward bias of 1.1 percent per year. Of the total bias, 0.6 percent was ascribed to
unmeasured quality improvements. To illustrate the nature of the quality bias, consider the
case of a personal computer. Suppose that between 1995 and 1996 the nominal price of a
computer increased by 2 percent. Assume also that during this period the quality of personal
computers, measured by attributes such as memory, processing speed, and video capabilities,
increased signiﬁcantly. If the statistical oﬃce in charge of producing the consumer price index
did not adjust the price index for quality improvement, then it would report two percent
inﬂation in personal computers. However, because a personal computer in 1996 provides
more services than does a personal computer in 1995, the quality-adjusted rate of inﬂation
in personal computers should be recorded as lower than two percent. The diﬀerence between
the reported rate of inﬂation and the quality-adjusted rate of inﬂation is called the quality
bias in measured inﬂation.
The existence of a positive quality bias has led some to argue that an inﬂation target
equal in size to the bias would be appropriate if the ultimate objective of the central bank
is price stability. In this section, we critically evaluate this argument. Speciﬁcally, we study
whether the central bank should adjust its inﬂation target to account for the systematic
56upward bias in measured inﬂation due to quality improvements in consumption goods. We
show that the answer to this question depends critically on what prices are assumed to
be sticky. If nonquality-adjusted prices are sticky, then the inﬂation target should not be
corrected. If, on the other hand, quality-adjusted (or hedonic) prices are sticky, then the
inﬂation target must be raised by the magnitude of the bias. Our analysis follows closely
Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2009b).
10.1 A Simple Model of Quality Bias
We analyze the relationship between a quality bias in measured inﬂation and the optimal
rate of inﬂation in the context of the neo-Keynesian model of section 6.1 without capital.
The key modiﬁcation we introduce to that framework is that the quality of consumption
goods is assumed to increase over time. This modiﬁcation gives rise to an inﬂation bias if
the statistical agency in charge of constructing the consumer price index fails to take quality
improvements into account. The central question we entertain here is whether the inﬂation
target should be adjusted by the presence of this bias.
The economy is populated by a large number of households with preferences deﬁned over
a continuum of goods of measure one indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Each unit of good i sells for
Pit dollars in period t. We denote the quantity of good i purchased by the representative
consumer in period t by cit. The quality of good i is denoted by xit and is assumed to evolve
exogenously and to satisfy xit >x it−1. The household cares about a composite good given
by
￿Z 1
0
(xitcit)
1−1/ηdi
￿1/(1−1/η)
,
where η>1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent good varieties. Note that
the utility of the household increases with the quality content of each good. Let at denote
the amount of the composite good the household wishes to consume in period t. Then, the
demand for goods of variety i is the solution to the following cost-minimization problem
min
{cit}
Z 1
0
Pitcitdi
subject to
￿Z 1
0
(xitcit)
1−1/ηdi
￿1/(1−1/η)
≥ at.
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cit =
￿
Qit
Qt
￿−η at
xit
,
where
Qit ≡ Pit/xit
denotes the quality-adjusted (or hedonic) price of good i, and Qt is a quality-adjusted (or
hedonic) price index given by
Qt =
￿Z 1
0
Q
1−η
it di
￿1/(1−η)
.
The price index Qt has the property that the total cost of at units of composite good is given
by Qtat, that is,
R 1
0 Pitcitdi = Qtat. Because at is the object from which households derive
utility, it follows from this property that Qt, the unit price of at, represents the appropriate
measure of the cost of living.
Households supply labor eﬀort to the market for a nominal wage rate Wt and are assumed
to have access to a complete set of ﬁnancial assets. Their budget constraint is given by
Qtat + Etrt,t+1Dt+1 + Tt = Dt + Wtht +Φ t,
where rt,t+j is a discount factor deﬁned so that the dollar price in period t of any random
nominal payment Dt+j in period t + j is given by Etrt,t+jDt+j. The variable Φt denotes
nominal proﬁts received from the ownership of ﬁrms, and the variable Tt denotes lump-sum
taxes.
The lifetime utility function of the representative household is given by
E0
∞ X
t=0
β
tU(at,h t),
where the period utility function U is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave
and β ∈ (0,1). The household chooses processes {at,h t,D t+1} to maximize this utility func-
tion subject to the sequential budget constraint and a no-Ponzi-game restriction of the form
limj→∞ Etrt,t+jDt+j ≥ 0. The optimality conditions associated with the household’s problem
are the sequential budget constraint, the no-Ponzi-game restriction holding with equality,
and
−
U2(at,h t)
U1(at,h t)
=
Wt
Qt
58and
U1(at,h t)
Qt
rt,t+1 = β
U1(at+1,h t+1)
Qt+1
.
Each intermediate consumption good i ∈ [0,1] is produced by a monopolistically com-
petitive ﬁrm via a linear production function zthit, where hit denotes labor input used in the
production of good i, and zt is an aggregate productivity shock. Proﬁts of ﬁrm i in period t
are given by
Pitcit − Wthit(1 − τ),
where τ denotes a subsidy per unit of labor received from the government. This subsidy is
introduced so that under ﬂexible prices the monopolistic ﬁrm would produce the competitive
level of output. In this way, the only distortion remaining in the model is the one associated
with sluggish price adjustment. While this assumption, which is customary in the neo-
Keynesian literature, greatly facilitates the characterization of optimal monetary policy, it
is not crucial in deriving the main results of this section.
The ﬁrm must satisfy demand at posted prices. Formally, this requirement gives rise to
the restriction
zthit ≥ cit,
where, as derived earlier, cit is given by cit =
￿
Qit
Qt
￿−η
at
xit. Let MCit denote the Lagrange
multiplier on the above constraint. Then, the optimality condition of the ﬁrm’s problem
with respect to labor is given by
(1 − τ)Wt = MCitzt.
It is clear from this ﬁrst-order condition that MCit must be identical across ﬁrms. We
therefore drop the subscript i from this variable.
Consider now the price setting problem of the monopolistically competitive ﬁrm. For
the purpose of determining the optimal inﬂation target, it is crucial to be precise in regard
to what prices are assumed to be costly to adjust. We distinguish two cases. In one case
we assume that nonquality-adjusted prices, Pit, are sticky. In the second case, we assume
that quality-adjusted (or hedonic) prices, Qit, are sticky. Using again the example of the
personal computer, the case of stickiness in nonquality-adjusted prices would correspond to
a situation in which the price of the personal computer is costly to adjust. The case of
stickiness in quality-adjusted prices results when the price of a computer per unit of quality
is sticky, where in our example quality would be measured by an index capturing attributes
such as memory, processing speed, video capabilities, etc.. We consider ﬁrst the case in
which stickiness occurs at the level of nonquality-adjusted prices.
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Suppose that with probability α ﬁrm i ∈ [0,1] cannot reoptimize its price, Pit, in a given
period. Consider the price-setting problem of a ﬁrm that has the chance to reoptimize its
price in period t. Let ˜ Pit be the price chosen by such ﬁrm. The portion of the Lagrangian as-
sociated with the ﬁrm’s optimization problem that is relevant for the purpose of determining
˜ Pit is given by
L = Et
∞ X
j=0
rt,t+jα
j
h
˜ Pit − MCt+j
i
 
˜ Pit
xit+jQt+j
!−η
at+j
xit+j
.
The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ˜ Pit is given by
Et
∞ X
j=0
rt,t+jα
j
￿￿
η − 1
η
￿
˜ Pit − MCt+j
￿ 
˜ Pit
xit+jQt+j
!−η
at+j
xit+j
=0 .
Although we believe that the case of greatest empirical interest is one in which quality
varies across goods, maintaining such assumption complicates the aggregation of the model,
as it adds another source of heterogeneity in addition to the familiar price dispersion stem-
ming from Calvo-Yun staggering. Consequently, to facilitate aggregation, we assume that all
goods are of the same quality, that is, we assume that xit = xt for all i. We further simplify
the exposition by assuming that xt grows at the constant rate κ>0, that is,
xt =( 1+κ)xt−1.
In this case, the above ﬁrst-order condition simpliﬁes to
Et
∞ X
j=0
rt,t+jα
j
￿￿
η − 1
η
￿
˜ Pit − MCt+j
￿ 
˜ Pit
Pt+j
!−η
ct+j =0 ,
where
ct ≡
￿Z 1
0
c
1−1/η
it di
￿1/(1−1/η)
and
Pt ≡
￿Z 1
0
P
1−η
it di
￿1/(1−η)
.
It is clear from these expressions that all ﬁrms that have the chance to reoptimize their price
in a given period will choose the same price. We therefore drop the subscript i from the
60variable ˜ Pit. We also note that the deﬁnitions of Pt and ct imply that Ptct =
R 1
0 Pitcitdi. Thus
Pt can be interpreted as the consumer price index unadjusted for quality improvements.
The aggregate price level Pt is related to the reoptimized price ˜ Pt by the following familiar
expression in the Calvo-Yun framework:
P
1−η
t = αP
1−η
t−1 +( 1− α) ˜ P
1−η
t .
Market clearing for good i requires that
zthit =
￿
Pit
Pt
￿−η
ct.
Integrating over i ∈ [0,1] yields
ztht = ct
Z 1
0
￿
Pit
Pt
￿−η
di,
where ht ≡
R 1
0 hitdi. Letting st ≡
R 1
0
￿
Pit
Pt
￿−η
di, we can write the aggregate resource con-
straint as
ztht = stct,
where, as shown earlier in section 6, st measures the degree of price dispersion in the economy
and obeys the law of motion
st =( 1− α)˜ p
−η
t + απ
η
t st−1,
where ˜ pt ≡ ˜ Pt/Pt denotes the relative price of goods whose price was reoptimized in period
t, and πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denotes the gross rate of inﬂation in period t not adjusted for quality
improvements.
A competitive equilibrium is a set of processes ct, ht, mct, st, and ˜ pt satisfying
−
U2(xtct,h t)
U1(xtct,h t)
=
mctztxt
1 − τ
,
ztht = stct,
st =( 1− α)˜ p
−η
t + απ
η
t st−1,
1=απ
η−1
t +( 1− α)˜ p
1−η
t ,
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Et
∞ X
s=t
(αβ)
sU1(xscs,h s)
U1(xtct,h t)
 
s Y
k=t+1
π
−1
k
!−η
xscs
"
mcs −
￿
η − 1
η
￿
˜ pt
 
s Y
k=t+1
π
−1
k
!#
=0 ,
given exogenous processes zt and xt and a policy regime πt. The variable mct ≡ MCt/Pt
denotes the marginal cost of production in terms of the composite good ct.
We now establish that when nonquality-adjusted prices are sticky, the Ramsey optimal
monetary policy calls for not incorporating the quality bias into the inﬂation target. That
is, the optimal monetary policy consists in constant nonquality-adjusted prices. To this end,
as in previous sections, we assume that s−1 = 1, so that there is no inherited price dispersion
in period 0. Set πt = 1 for all t and 1 − τ =( η − 1)/η. By the same arguments given
in section 6.2, the above equilibrium conditions become identical to those associated with
the problem of maximizing E0
P∞
t=0 βtU(xtct,h t), subject to ztht = ct. We have therefore
demonstrated that setting πt equal to unity is not only Ramsey optimal but also Pareto
eﬃcient.
Importantly, πt is the rate of inﬂation that results from measuring prices without ad-
justing for quality improvement. The inﬂation rate that takes into account improvements
in the quality of goods is given by Qt/Qt−1, which equals πt/(1 + κ) and is less than πt by
our maintained assumption that quality improves over time at the rate κ>0. Therefore,
although there is a quality bias in the measurement of inﬂation, given by the rate of quality
improvement κ, the central bank should not target a positive rate of inﬂation.
This result runs contrary to the usual argument that in the presence of a quality bias in
the aggregate price level, the central bank should adjust its inﬂation target upwards by the
magnitude of the quality bias. For instance, suppose that, in line with the ﬁndings of the
Boskin Commission, the quality bias in the rate of inﬂation was 0.6 percent (or κ =0 .006).
Then, the conventional wisdom would suggest that the central bank of the economy analyzed
in this section target a rate of inﬂation of about 0.6 percent. We have shown, however, that
such policy would be suboptimal. Rather, optimal policy calls for a zero inﬂation target.
The key to understanding this result is to identify exactly which prices are sticky. For
optimal policy aims at keeping the price of goods that are sticky constant over time to avoid
ineﬃcient price dispersion. Here we are assuming that stickiness originates in non-quality
adjusted prices. Therefore, optimal policy consists in keeping these prices constant over time.
At the same time, because quality-adjusted (or hedonic) prices are ﬂexible, the monetary
authority can let them decline at the rate κ without creating distortions.
Suppose now that the statistical agency responsible for constructing the consumer price
index decided to correct the index to reﬂect quality improvements. For example, in response
62Table 4: The Optimal Rate of Inﬂation under Quality Bias
Statistical Agency
Corrects Quality Bias
Stickiness in No Yes
Nonquality-Adjusted Prices 0 −κ
Quality-Adjusted (or Hedonic) Prices κ 0
Note. The parameter κ>0 denotes the rate of quality improvement.
to the publication of the Boskin Commission report, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
reinforced its use of hedonic prices in the construction of the CPI. In the ideal case in which
all of the quality bias is eliminated from the CPI, the statistical agency would publish data
on Qt rather than on Pt. How should the central bank adjust its inﬂation target in response
to this methodological advancement? The goal of the central bank continues to be the
complete stabilization of the nonquality-adjusted price, Pt, for this is the price that suﬀers
from stickiness. To achieve this goal, the published price index, Qt, would have to be falling
at the rate of quality improvement, κ. This means that the central bank would have to
target deﬂation at the rate κ.
To summarize, when nonquality-adjusted prices are sticky, the optimal inﬂation target
of the central bank is either zero (when the statistical agency does not correct the price
index for quality improvements) or negative at the rate of quality improvement (when the
statistical agency does correct the price index for quality improvements). See table 4.
10.3 Stickiness in Quality-Adjusted Prices
Assume now that quality-adjusted (or hedonic) prices, Qit, are costly to adjust. Consider
the price-setting problem of a ﬁrm, i say, that has the chance to reoptimize Qit in period t.
Let ˜ Qit be the quality-adjusted price chosen by such ﬁrm. The portion of the Lagrangian
associated with the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem that is relevant for the purpose of
determining the optimal level of ˜ Qit is given by
L = Et
∞ X
j=0
rt,t+jα
j
h
˜ Qitxt+j − MCt+j
i 
˜ Qit
Qt+j
!−η
ct+j.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to ˜ Qit is given by
Et
∞ X
j=0
rt,t+jα
j
￿￿
η − 1
η
￿
˜ Qitxt+j − MCt+j
￿ 
˜ Qit
Qt+j
!−η
ct+j =0 .
63A competitive equilibrium in the economy with stickiness in quality-adjusted prices is a
set of processes ct, ht, mct, st, and ˜ pt that satisfy
−
U2(xtct,h t)
U1(xtct,h t)
=
mctztxt
1 − τ
ztht = stct
st =( 1− α)(˜ pt)
−η + α
￿
πt
xt−1
xt
￿η
st−1,
1=απ
η−1
t
￿
xt
xt−1
￿1−η
+( 1− α)(˜ pt)
1−η,
and
Et
∞ X
s=t
(αβ)
sU1(xscs,h s)
U1(xtct,h t)
 
s Y
k=t+1
π
−1
k
!−η
xscs
"
mcs −
￿
η − 1
η
￿
˜ pt
 
s Y
k=t+1
π
−1
k
!
xs
xt
#
=0 ,
given exogenous processes zt and xt and a policy regime πt.
We wish to demonstrate that when quality-adjusted prices are sticky, the optimal rate of
inﬂation is positive and equal to the rate of quality improvement, κ. Again assume no initial
dispersion of relative prices by setting s−1 = 1. Then, setting πt = xt/xt−1, we have that
in the competitive equilibrium ˜ pt = 1 and st = 1 for all t. Assuming further that the ﬁscal
authority sets 1 − τ =( η − 1)/η, we have that the set of competitive equilibrium conditions
becomes identical to the set of optimality conditions associated with the social planner’s
problem of maximizing E0
P∞
t=0 βtU(xtct,h t), subject to ztht = ct.
We have therefore proven that when quality-adjusted prices are sticky, a positive inﬂation
target equal to the rate of quality improvement (πt =1+κ) is Ramsey optimal and Pareto
eﬃcient. In this case, the optimal adjustment in the inﬂation target conforms to the con-
ventional wisdom, according to which the quality bias in inﬂation measurement justiﬁes an
upward correction of the inﬂation target equal in size to the bias itself. The intuition behind
this result is that in order to avoid relative price dispersion, the monetary authority must
engineer a policy whereby ﬁrms have no incentives to change prices that are sticky. In the
case considered here the prices that are sticky happen to be the quality-adjusted prices. At
the same time, non-quality adjusted prices are fully ﬂexible and therefore under the optimal
policy they are allowed to grow at the rate κ without creating ineﬃciencies.
Finally, suppose that the statistical agency in charge of preparing the consumer price
index decided to correct the quality bias built into the price index. In this case, the central
bank should revise its inﬂation target downward to zero in order to accomplish its goal of
64price stability in (sticky) quality-adjusted prices. Table 4 summarizes the results of this
section.
We interpret the results derived in this section as suggesting that if the case of greatest
empirical relevance is one in which nonquality-adjusted prices (the price of the personal
computer in the example we have been using throughout) is sticky, then the conventional
wisdom that quality bias justiﬁes an upward adjustment in the inﬂation target is misplaced.
Applying this conclusion to the case of the United States, it would imply that no fraction of
the 2 percent inﬂation target implicit in Fed policy is justiﬁable on the basis of the quality
bias in the U.S. consumer price index. Moreover, the corrective actions taken by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics in response to the ﬁndings of the Boskin commission, including new
hedonic indexes for television sets and personal computers as well as an improved treatment-
based methodology for measuring medical care prices, would actually justify setting negative
inﬂation targets. If, on the other hand, the more empirically relevant case is the one in which
hedonic prices are sticky, then the conventional view that the optimal inﬂation target should
be adjusted upward by the size of the quality bias is indeed consistent with the predictions
of our model. The central empirical question raised by the theoretical analysis presented
in this section is therefore whether regular or hedonic prices are more sticky. The existing
empirical literature on nominal price rigidities has yet to address this matter.
11 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the question whether observed inﬂation targets around the world,
ranging from two percent in developed countries to three and a half percent in developing
countries, can be justiﬁed on welfare-theoretic grounds. The two leading sources of monetary
nonneutrality in modern models of the monetary transmission mechanism—the demand for
money and sluggish price adjustment—jointly predict optimal inﬂation targets of at most
zero percent per year.
Additional reasons frequently put forward in explaining the desirability of inﬂation targets
of the magnitude observed in the real world—including incomplete taxation, the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates, downward rigidity in nominal wages, and a quality bias
in measured inﬂation—are shown to deliver optimal rates of inﬂation insigniﬁcantly above
zero.
Our analysis left out three potentially relevant theoretical considerations bearing on the
optimal rate of inﬂation. One is heterogeneity in income across economic agents. To the
extent that the income elasticity of money demand is less than unity, lower income agents
will hold a larger fraction of their income in money than high income agents. As a result,
65under these circumstances the inﬂation rate acts as a regressive tax. This channel, therefore,
is likely to put downward pressure on the optimal rate of inﬂation, insofar as the objective
function of the policymaker is egalitarian.
A second theoretical omission in our analysis concerns heterogeneity in consumption
growth rates across regions in a monetary union. To the extent that the central bank of
the monetary union is concerned with avoiding deﬂation, possibly because of downward
nominal rigidities, it will engineer a monetary policy consistent with price stability in the
fastest growing region. This policy implies that all other regions of the union will experience
inﬂation until diﬀerentials in consumption growth rates have disappeared. To our knowledge,
this argument has not yet been evaluated in the context of an estimated dynamic model of
a monetary union. But perhaps more importantly, this channel would not be useful to
explain why small, relatively homogeneous countries, such as New Zealand, Sweden, or
Switzerland, have chosen inﬂation targets similar in magnitude to those observed in larger,
less homogeneous, currency areas such as the United States or the Euro area. Here one might
object that the small countries are simply following the leadership of the large countries.
However, the pioneers in setting inﬂation targets of 2 percent were indeed small countries
like New Zealand, Canada, and Sweden.
A third theoretical channel left out from our investigation is time inconsistency on the part
of the monetary policy authority. Throughout our analysis, we assume that the policymaker
has access to a commitment technology that ensures that all policy announcements are
honored. Our decision to restrict attention to the commitment case is twofold: First, the
commitment case provides the optimum optimarum inﬂation target, which serves as an
important benchmark. Second, it is our believe that political and economic institutions in
industrial countries have reached a level of development at which central bankers ﬁnd it in
their own interest to honor past promises. In other words, we believe that it is realistic
to model central bankers as having access to some commitment technology, or, as Blinder
(1999) has it, that ‘enlightened discretion is the rule.’
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12.1 Derivation of the Primal Form of the Model with a Demand
for Money and Fiscal Policy of section 3
We ﬁrst show that plans {ct,h t,v t} satisfying the equilibrium conditions (2), (4) holding with
equality, (5), (7), (8), (11), and (13)-(15) also satisfy (14), (16), vt ≥ v, and v2
ts0(vt) < 1. Let
γ(vt) ≡ 1+s(vt)+vts0(vt). Note that (5), (11), and our maintained assumptions regarding
s(v) together imply that vt ≥ v and v2
ts0(vt) < 1. Let Wt+1 = RtBt+Mt. Use this expression
to eliminate Bt from (15) and multiply by qt ≡
Qt−1
s=0 R−1
s to obtain
qtMt(1 − R
−1
t )+qt+1Wt+1 − qtWt = qt[Ptgt − τ
h
t Ptwtht].
Sum for t =0t ot = T to obtain
T X
t=0
￿
qtMt(1 − R
−1
t ) − qt(Ptgt − τ
h
t Ptwtht)
￿
= −qT+1WT+1 + W0.
In writing this expression, we deﬁne q0 =1 .
Take limits for T →∞ . By (4) holding with equality the limit of the right hand side is
well deﬁned and equal to W0. Thus, the limit of the left-hand side exists. This yields:
∞ X
t=0
￿
qtMt(1 − R
−1
t ) − qt(Ptgt − τ
h
t Ptwtht)
￿
= W0
By (7) we have that Ptqt = βtUc(ct,h t)/γ(vt)P0/Uc(c0,h 0)γ(v0). Use this expression to
eliminate Ptqt from the above equation. Also, use (2) to eliminate Mt/Pt to obtain
∞ X
t=0
β
tUc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)
￿
ct
vt
(1 − R
−1
t ) − (gt − τ
h
t wtht)
￿
=
W0
P0
Uc(c0,h 0)
γ(v0)
Solve (13) for τh
t and (8) for wt to obtain τh
t wtht = F 0(ht)ht + γ(vt)/Uc(ct,h t)Uh(ct,h t)ht.
Use this expression to eliminate τh
t wtht from the above equation. Also use (5) to replace
(1 − R
−1
t )/vt with vts0(vt), and replace gt with (14). This yields
∞ X
t=0
β
t
￿
Uc(ct,h t)ct + Uh(ct,h t)ht +
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)
[F
0(ht)ht − F(ht)]
￿
=
W0
P0
Uc(c0,h 0)
γ(v0)
67Finally, use W0 = R−1B−1 + M−1 to obtain
∞ X
t=0
β
t
￿
Uc(ct,h t)ct + Uh(ct,h t)ht +[ F
0(ht)ht − F(ht)]
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)
￿
=
￿
R−1B−1 + M−1
P0
￿￿
Uc(c0,h 0)
γ(v0)
￿
which is (16).
Now we show that plans {ct,h t,v t} that satisfy vt ≥ v, v2
ts0(vt) < 1, (14), and (16) also
satisfy (2), (4) holding with equality, (5), (7), (8), (11), and (13)-(15) at all dates.
Given a plan {ct,h t,v t} proceed as follows. Use (5) to construct Rt as 1/[1 − v2
ts0(vt)].
Note that under the maintained assumptions on s(v), the constraints vt ≥ v and v2
ts0(vt) < 1
ensure that Rt ≥ 1. Let wt be given by (8) and τh
t by (13). To construct plans for Mt, Pt+1,
and Bt, for t ≥ 0, use the following iterative procedure: (a) Set t = 0; (b) Use equation (2)
to construct Mt (one can do this for t = 0 because P0 is given); (c) Set Bt so as to satisfy
equation (15); (d) Set Pt+1 to satisfy (7); (e) Increase t by 1 and repeat steps (b) to (e). This
procedure yields plans for Pt and thus for the gross inﬂation rate πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1. It remains to
be shown that (4) holds with equality. Sum (15) for t =0t ot = T, which as shown above,
yields:
T X
t=0
β
t
￿
Uc(ct,h t)ct + Uh(ct,h t)ht +[ F
0(ht)ht − F(ht)]
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)
￿
=
￿
−qT+1WT+1 + R−1B−1 + M−1
P0
￿
Uc(c0,h 0)
γ(v0)
By (16) the limit of the left-hand side of this expression as T →∞exists and is equal to
R−1B−1+M−1
P0
Uc(c0,h0)
γ(v0) . Thus the limit of the right-hand side also exists and we have:
lim
T→∞
qT+1WT+1 =0
which is (4). This completes the proof.
12.2 Derivation of the Primal Form in the Model with a Foreign
Demand for Domestic Currency of section 5
We ﬁrst show that plans {ct,h t,v t} satisfying the equilibrium conditions (2), (4) holding
with equality, (5), (7), (8), (11), (13), and (25)-(28) also satisfy (29), (30), (31), vt ≥ v, and
v2
ts0(vt) < 1. Note that, as in the case without a foreign demand for currency, (5), (11), and
our maintained assumptions regarding s(v) together imply that vt ≥ v and v2
ts0(vt) < 1.
Let Wt+1 = RtBt+Mt +M
f
t . Use this expression to eliminate Bt from (27) and multiply
68by qt ≡
Qt−1
s=0 R−1
s to obtain
qt(Mt + M
f
t )(1 − R
−1
t )+qt+1Wt+1 − qtWt = qt[Ptgt − τ
h
t PtF(ht)].
Sum for t =0t ot = T to obtain
T X
t=0
h
qt(Mt + M
f
t )(1 − R
−1
t ) − qt(Ptgt − τ
h
t PtF(ht))
i
= −qT+1WT+1 + W0.
In writing this expression, we deﬁne q0 = 1. Solve (13) for τh
t and (8) for wt and use F(h)=h
to obtain τh
t F(ht)=ht +
Uh(ct,ht)
Uc(ct,ht)γ(vt)ht. Use this expression to eliminate τh
t F(ht) from the
above equation, which yields
T X
t=0
￿
qt(Mt + M
f
t )(1 − R
−1
t ) − qtPt
￿
gt −
￿
ht +
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)ht
￿￿￿
= −qT+1WT+1 + W0.
Use the feasibility constraint (28) to replace ht − gt with [1 + s(vt)]ct −
M
f
t −M
f
t−1
Pt .
T X
t=0
qtPt
(
Mt + M
f
t
Pt
(1 − R
−1
t )+[ 1+s(vt)]ct −
M
f
t − M
f
t−1
Pt
+
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)ht
)
= −qT+1WT+1+W0.
Use (2) and (5) to replace Mt
Pt (1 − R
−1
t ) with vts0(vt)ct
T X
t=0
qtPt
(
vts
0(vt)ct −
M
f
t
PtRt
+[ 1+s(vt)]ct +
M
f
t−1
Pt
+
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)ht
)
= −qT+1WT+1+W0.
Collect terms in ct and replace 1 + s(vt)+vts0(vt) with γ(vt) and rearrange
T X
t=0
qtPt
(
γ(vt)ct +
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)ht −
M
f
t
PtRt
+
M
f
t−1
Pt
)
= −qT+1WT+1 + W0.
Noting that by deﬁnition qt/Rt = qt+1 write the above expression as
T X
t=0
qtPt
￿
γ(vt)ct +
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)ht
￿
+
T X
t=0
￿
M
f
t−1qt − M
f
t qt+1
￿
= −qT+1WT+1 + W0.
69Evaluate the second sum on the left-hand side and recall that by deﬁnition q0 = 1 to obtain
T X
t=0
qtPt
￿
γ(vt)ct +
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)ht
￿
+ M
f
−1 − M
f
TqT+1 = −qT+1WT+1 + W0.
Using the deﬁnition of Wt we can write the above expression as:
T X
t=0
qtPt
￿
γ(vt)ct +
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)ht
￿
= −qT+1 (RTBT + MT)+R−1B−1 + M−1. (65)
Take limits for T →∞ . Then by (4) holding with equality the limit of the right hand side is
well deﬁned and equal to R−1B−1 + M−1. Thus, the limit of the left-hand side exists. This
yields:
∞ X
t=0
qtPt
￿
γ(vt)ct +
Uh(ct,h t)
Uc(ct,h t)
γ(vt)ht
￿
= R−1B−1 + M−1.
By (7) we have that Ptqt = βtUc(ct,h t)/γ(vt)P0/Uc(c0,h 0)γ(v0). Use this expression to
eliminate Ptqt from the above equation to obtain
∞ X
t=0
β
t [Uc(ct,h t)ct + Uh(ct,h t)ht]=
￿
Uc(c0,h 0)
γ(v0)
￿￿
R−1B−1 + M−1
P0
￿
,
which is (31).
We next show that the competitive equilibrium conditions imply (29) and (30). Equation
(29) follows directly from (26) and the deﬁnition of χ(vt) given in (32). For t>0, use (26)
to eliminate M
f
t and M
f
t−1 from (28) to obtain:
[1 + s(vt)]ct + gt = F(ht)+
y
f
t
v
f
t
−
y
f
t−1
v
f
t−1
1
πt
.
Now use (7) to eliminate πt. This yields:
[1 + s(vt)]ct + gt = F(ht)+
y
f
t
χ(vt)
−
y
f
t−1
χ(vt−1)
Uc(ct−1,h t−1)
Rt−1γ(vt−1)
γ(vt)
βUc(ct,h t)
,
Using (5) to replace Rt−1 yields (30). This completes the proof that the competitive equi-
librium conditions imply the primal form conditions.
We now show that plans {ct,h t,v t} satisfying (29), (30), (31), vt ≥ v, and v2
ts0(vt) < 1
also satisfy the equilibrium conditions (2), (4) holding with equality, (5), (7), (8), (11), (13),
70and (25)-(28). Given a plan {ct,h t,v t} proceed as follows. Use (5) to construct Rt and (25)
to construct v
f
t . Note that under the maintained assumptions on s(v), the constraints vt ≥ v
and v2
ts0(vt) < 1 ensure that Rt ≥ 1. Let wt be given by (8) and τh
t by (13).
To construct plans for Mt, M
f
t , Pt+1, and Bt, for t ≥ 0, use the following iterative
procedure: (a) Set t = 0; (b) Use equation (2) to construct Mt and equation (26) to construct
M
f
t (recall that P0 is given); (c) Set Bt so as to satisfy equation (27); (d) Set Pt+1 to satisfy
(7); (e) Increase t by 1 and repeat steps (b) to (e). Next we want to show that (28) holds.
First we want to show that it holds for t = 0. Combining (26) and (32) with (29) it is
obvious that (28) holds for t = 0. To show that it also holds for t>0, combine (26), (32),
and (30) to obtain:
[1 + s(vt)]ct + gt = F(ht)+
M
f
t
Pt
−
M
f
t−1
Pt−1
￿
1 − v
2
t−1s
0(vt−1)
￿ Uc(ct−1,h t−1)
γ(vt−1)
γ(vt)
βUc(ct,h t)
,
Using (5) one can write this expression as:
[1 + s(vt)]ct + gt = F(ht)+
M
f
t
Pt
−
M
f
t−1
Pt−1
(1/Rt−1)
Uc(ct−1,h t−1)
γ(vt−1)
γ(vt)
βUc(ct,h t)
,
Finally, combining this expression with (7) yields (28).
It remains to be shown that (4) holds with equality. Follow the steps shown above to
arrive at equation (65). Notice that these steps make use only of equilibrium conditions that
we have already shown are implied by the primal form. Now use (7) (which we have already
shown to hold) to replace Ptqt with βtUc(ct,h t)/γ(vt)P0/Uc(c0,h 0)γ(v0) to obtain
T X
t=0
β
t [Uc(ct,h t)ct + Uh(ct,h t)ht]=−qT+1(RTBT+MT)
￿
Uc(c0,h 0)
P0γ(v0)
￿
+
￿
Uc(c0,h 0)
γ(v0)
￿￿
R−1B−1 + M−1
P0
￿
.
Taking limit for T →∞ , recalling the deﬁnition of qt, and using (31) yields (4) holding with
equality. This completes the proof.
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